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ARTICLE
TAILORING REMEDIES TO SPUR
INNOVATION
SARAH R. WASSERMAN RAJEC∗
An emerging rule in the district courts—thus far endorsed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—allows a victorious patent holder to receive a
permanent injunction against an infringer if she is able to show that she has suffered
a loss of market share due to the infringement. The larger the loss of market share the
patent holder can prove, the more likely the court will issue an injunction. This
“market share rule” is a response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., exhorting lower courts to engage in equitable balancing
before awarding permanent injunctions. The case followed a flare-up of concern over
entities—sometimes termed “patent trolls”—that do not practice their patents but
demand what some consider exorbitant licensing fees from those who would. These
entities arguably introduce inefficiencies into the patent system that impede
innovation, thereby affecting access. Although academics and practitioners hoped that
eBay would address particular instances in which the availability of an injunction
hinders innovation, market share is an imperfect indicator of innovative activity.
Importantly, for the purpose of identifying entities that hinder innovation, market
share is simultaneously over- and under-inclusive. The market share rule is overinclusive because some of the business models that currently contribute the most to
innovation lack market share. To protect these innovators, courts are contorting the
emerging rule to grant permanent injunctions for innovative companies that lack
market share. The market share rule is also under-inclusive because firms that possess
high levels of market share have incentives not to bring innovation to market, and yet
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these incentives are not accounted for under the market share rule.
A better rule would allow courts to explicitly evaluate the effects of permanent
injunctions on incentives to innovate and to provide access to that innovation under
a public interest analysis. Although loss of market share should remain one measure
of the need for injunctive relief, its influence should be tempered by a serious analysis
of the public’s interest in encouraging innovation on the one hand, and access on the
other. This more balanced analysis will necessarily include information about market
structure as well. A market share rule that incorporates a public interest analysis
would allow courts to curtail remedies in situations likely to lead to holdups, while
granting injunctions to entities with business models that rely on licensing fees to fund
further research, thereby granting remedies tailored to the innovation and access goals
that form the basis of the patent system.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................ 734
I. Patent Law and Permanent Injunctions .................................. 740
II. Concerns About Skewed Incentives, the eBay Decision, and
Its Progeny: A Rule Emerges ................................................... 742
A. The Path to eBay ............................................................. 742
B. The eBay Decision .............................................................. 748
C. eBay’s Progeny: The Market Share Rule .......................... 751
III. Questioning the Rule ............................................................... 758
A. The Limits of Irreparable Injury and Inadequacy of
Money Damages to Identify Inefficient Actors ................ 758
B. The Limits of Market Share as an Indicator of
Irreparable Injury and Inadequacy of Money Damages .. 761
C. The Limits of Market Share as an Indicator of
Innovative Incentives ......................................................... 764
IV. Using Market Share Critically: A Greater Role for the
Public Interest Prong ............................................................... 773
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 783
INTRODUCTION
In order to encourage innovation, patent law offers a time-limited
1
right to exclude to inventors who disclose their inventions. The
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries . . . .”); see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989), as reprinted in
MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 33–34 (1998)
(explaining how the courts expect the right of exclusion to provide an incentive for
individuals to invest in research and to disclose their new inventions, thereby
benefiting the general public); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent
Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181,
195–97 (2009) (analyzing how the patent system offers a solution to the public goods
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disclosure-for-protection trade-off assumes that a patent holder will
use this time to profit from producing or licensing the invention,
thus rewarding her investment in research and development and
benefiting the public by granting it access to the technology before
2
the patent expires. Remedies for infringement of this right may
include money damages or equitable remedies, such as a permanent
3
injunction against future infringement.
The Supreme Court
considered the proper analysis for determining whether to grant
4
injunctions in patent cases in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. This
Article addresses whether eBay has positively influenced the law such
that injunctions are being granted in ways that fit the constitutional
purposes of the patent system, and in particular, the goal of
encouraging innovation that will result in access to new technology by
consumers or other innovators. These goals are generalized versions
of the concerns that were increasingly voiced in the period before the
5
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Specific concerns were focused
on problems that can be described as “suspect patents,” such as
6
improvidently granted or overbroad patents, and “suspect entities,”
problem by granting inventors exclusive right to control their invention for twenty
years).
2. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1580 (2003) (discussing how the exclusive rights granted to inventors is a
limitation society is willing to accept in the name of greater innovation and social
utility of inventions); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2004) (explaining how the protections offered to inventors
create incentives or rewards for continued innovation by eliminating the fear that a
product could be appropriated by a competitor); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2000) (elaborating
how the assumption that patent laws lead to innovation is based on market incentives
causing patentees to act efficiently by licensing their product, which allows for public
exposure and further innovation).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases
under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court
deems reasonable.”).
4. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006).
5. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (2004) (describing how the growing risks of being sued, and
the royalties patent holders must pay to avoid such lawsuits, have become hurdles
that further threaten innovation); Michelle Kessler, Patent Lawsuits Hit Tech Titans,
USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-02-12-patentlawsuits_x.htm (mentioning the increasing number of lawsuits large companies face
from small inventors with broad patents); Bernard Stamler, Battles of the Patents, Like
David v. Goliath, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/21
/business/businessspecial2/21patent.html?r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print
(quoting a patent lawyer who likened patent troll activity to “legalized extortion” but
noting that it is not always clear which actor is like David and which like Goliath
based on business size alone).
6. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 118–19 (discussing how State Street Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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such as companies that do not practice their patents but exist solely
7
to hold up productive companies for exorbitant licensing fees.
Problems with overbroad or improvidently granted patents were not
central to the dispute in eBay, and have since been addressed more
8
fully by Bilski v. Kappos and the recently enacted America Invents
9
Act. The Court, however, faced the problem of suspect entities in
10
eBay. An examination of the case law following eBay demonstrates
that courts are indeed identifying certain situations in which
incentives to innovate may be distorted by particular types of patent
holders that do not practice their patents. Specifically, courts grant
injunctions for patent infringement where the patent holder is a
competitor with significant market share and deny injunctions to
11
entities that cannot show market share. These decisions are made
within the framework of the traditional equitable test for injunctions,
12
reiterated in eBay.
Market share is considered significant to
1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998), expanded patentability to include patents on business
methods).
7. See id. at 111–15 (discussing the increased grant of permanent injunctions
following the formation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit).
8. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1001 (2010). In 2006, it was assumed that
the Court would address both problems through a pair of cases: Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (LabCorp), 548 U.S. 124, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065 (2006) (per curiam), for suspect patents, and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006), for suspect entities. See, e.g.,
Inventing the Future, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
2006-04-03/news/0604030151_1_patent-system-patent-and-trademark-officeinvention (discussing eBay and LabCorp as vehicles to address overbroad patents and
“automatic injunctions” for “a company whose primary business is enforcing the
patents it holds”). LabCorp, however, was dismissed as improvidently granted. 548
U.S. at 125, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
9. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6, 18, 22, 125
Stat. 284, 306, 329, 336 (2011) (including more opportunities for public feedback
during the application process, a new post-grant review system for patents directed
toward business methods, and a provision allowing the U.S.P.T.O. to set its own fees,
thus allowing for more examiners to be hired and the backlog of applications to be
addressed).
10. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (criticizing the appellate
court’s adoption of “certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief
could not issue in a broad swath of cases,” and particularly its holding that “a
‘plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents’ and ‘its lack of commercial activity in
practicing the patents’ would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would
not suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue” (citation omitted)).
Notably, the majority opinion did not explicitly address the application of an
equitable balancing test to NPEs, while both concurrences did. Id. at 394–95, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 395–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11. See infra Part II.C (explaining the new standard courts use to evaluate
whether to grant permanent injunctions).
12. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (noting that the
familiar principles of equity governing injunctions apply with “equal force” to
patents).
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determine the first two factors of that test—irreparable injury and
13
inadequacy of monetary damages. The other factors, balancing of
harm to the parties and the public interest, are generally recited pro
forma, with an assumption that both favor granting an injunction to
14
remedy patent infringement.
Upon closer examination, however, problems with the emerging
“market share rule” become apparent. If the ultimate goal of patent
law is to produce the optimal level of innovation, and if eBay was
meant to correct for instances in which incentives to innovate are
skewed, the current test is incorrect in form and too narrow in
practice. Concerns leading to eBay are properly cast as concerns
about the ability of a patent holder to hold up licensing negotiations,
thereby impacting potential licensees and the public by withholding
access to the invention during the life of the patent. With this
backdrop of innovation and access concerns, a focus on the factors of
irreparable injury and inadequacy of money damages misses an
opportunity to weigh access concerns under the public interest
factor, where those concerns should be considered. In addition,
distortions in incentives to innovate may indeed occur with entities
that have small amounts of market share, but market share is
ultimately a poor indicator of innovative potential. Market share is
just as likely to tell a story about the stage of development of a
company. Even when it describes the business model of a company,
lack of market share is overbroad, including in its ambit innovative
research companies and educational institutions. By privileging
certain business structures, reliance on market share also hinders the
emergence of other structures, such as firms that specialize in
15
research and development, rather than production and marketing.
Importantly, the essential assumption about the generally positive
correlation between market share and innovative potential of a firm
also breaks down under scrutiny. The correlation of market power
and innovation has been examined by economists and antitrust
13. E.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1943, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s injunction on these
factors and citing market share as a key consideration).
14. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1447–48, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1191, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing the third and fourth factors briefly
and weighing them in favor of granting an injunction).
15. This particular problem with a categorical rule was pointed out in eBay, too.
547 U.S. at 393, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (citing, for example, academic
researchers or inventors who prefer licensing their product rather than seeking
funding for marketing, finding that “[s]uch patent holders may be able to satisfy the
traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for categorically denying them the
opportunity to do so”). It is unclear how a categorical rule based on market share
could be more acceptable than the categorical rule struck down in eBay.
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scholars, whose literature suggests what courts have ignored: that
16
high levels of market power are also likely to lead to inefficiencies.
A more effective test would be to return market share to a
reasonable level of influence as a consideration under the first two
factors of the equitable test and to adopt an analysis of market share
(or power) under the public interest factor, which would allow for
balancing the value of strong patent rights with the public interest in
17
access to innovation.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I introduce the purpose
of the permanent injunction remedy in patent law and its place in the
balance struck by the patent grant. In Part II, I review the literature
surrounding eBay and the concern over patent “holdup” situations,
particularly in the case of non-practicing entities (NPEs), the eBay
case, and the concerns voiced in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence that
appear to have strongly influenced district courts. I conclude that
these concerns center on the idea that for certain patent holders,
incentives are skewed and that rather than leading to optimal levels
of innovation, they result in reduced access to emerging technologies
for the public and for other innovators. I next examine how district
courts have ruled on permanent injunctions following eBay and their
focus on the proxy measure of market share to identify these patent
holders. I find that, although the problem many hoped the Court
would remedy concerned the public interest in access, courts
generally grant injunctions by invoking the irreparable injury and
inadequacy of money damages prongs of the four-factor test when a
patent holder shows that it is a competitor with significant market
share.
In Part III, I turn to an assessment of the emerging market share
rule, arguing that by focusing on the identity of the patent holder
rather than balancing the exclusivity grant against its access benefits,
the market share rule is both under- and over-inclusive. However,
this mis-focus is endemic to an analysis under the first two factors,
which are centered on the patent holder and do not allow for
balancing the incentive structure embodied in the patent system with
the public interest in access to innovation.
The substance of the rule is of equal concern. After showing that
the market share rule imperfectly fulfills the narrow purpose of
16. See infra Part III.C (discussing how market share and market power are often
used interchangeably).
17. This suggestion finds support—albeit scant—in Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in eBay. 547 U.S. at 395–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing the need to weigh all four factors before
granting a remedy).
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denying injunctions to NPEs, Part III analyzes the broader purpose
behind the patent laws and the grant of a permanent injunction to
show that the rule may not increase incentives to bring innovation to
market. To this end, antitrust theory regarding the relationship
between market structure and incentives to innovate is instructive.
Antitrust looks at market power as an indicator of innovative
potential. At worst, contradictory and convoluted evidence fails to
support the idea that market power and innovative potential are
correlated. At best, initially competing but ultimately complementary
antitrust narratives indicate that innovative incentive may increase
with market power to a certain degree, but then decrease again once
a certain level of market power has been achieved. Regarding eBay
concerns, the implications are that patent holdup and access
concerns should not be limited to non-practicing or suspect entities,
but should also be of concern for all companies with high levels of
market power. Conversely, a suspect entity with little market power
will have little ability to hold up competition. Under this analysis,
market power as an indicator of potential access concerns emerges as
a useful addition to market share as an indicator of injury to the
patent holder when assessing the appropriateness of a permanent
injunction.
In Part IV, I examine the public interest prong of the four-factor
test and find that this inquiry properly allows weighing of the general
interest in strong patent rights with the public’s interest in access to
innovation. I then discuss a pair of cases in which injunctions were
denied and suggest that the courts employed contorted logic to reach
their conclusions. A straightforward consideration of market share
under a more robust public interest analysis would have resulted in
the same conclusion, without the contortions. Thus, the question
arises why the public interest prong has not been used to deny
permanent injunctions where there is too little or too much market
power. An examination of the eBay decision’s legal progenitor,
18
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., demonstrates the
influence of the notion that competitors are more deserving of
permanent injunctions than non-competitors, while an analysis of the
public interest prong of the four-factor test is almost absent.
Nonetheless, I argue that the public interest prong, not the first two
prongs of eBay, can properly account for situations in which the
strength of the patent right should be lessened to fix skewed

18. 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
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incentives that deny the public and other innovators access to
innovation.
I.

PATENT LAW AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS

The Constitution ensures the promotion of progress by granting
19
inventors exclusive but time-limited rights over their discoveries.
The right granted by a patent is the “right to exclude others from
20
The
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.”
patent grant incentivizes innovation by rewarding those who invent
something useful, and it provides knowledge of the innovation to the
public by dictating that the invention be disclosed and returning the
21
invention to the public domain when the patent expires.
The
disadvantage of the patent grant is that public access to the invention
is diminished in various ways: (1) a monopoly rent can be extracted
because of the lack of competition, and thus fewer people may be
willing or able to purchase the invention; (2) other inventions that
build on the patented invention may be delayed or not occur, thus
depriving both putative future innovators of the ability to innovate
and the public of access to a future innovation; and (3) the patent
holder may choose not to bring the invention to market at all. The
patent grant is, therefore, a balance of access interests.
The patent system thus provides incentives to innovate in the form
of granting a time-limited monopoly, characterized by a right to
22
exclude. The appropriate remedy for infringement of the patent
right typically has been deemed the permanent injunction, an
23
The
equitable remedy left to the discretion of the courts.
justification for granting a permanent injunction as opposed to other
24
remedies, such as a reasonable royalty award, follows the traditional
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
21. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645
(1998) (“[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages
both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”);
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 12–16 (2003) (utilizing “the tragedy of the commons”
to demonstrate the need for individual property rights in order to encourage
innovation).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (stating that the courts have jurisdiction to grant
injunctions to prevent patent violations).
23. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 430 (explaining that the most effective
means of enforcing patent rights is to prevent their infringement); John M. Golden,
Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2120 (2007)
(discussing how courts at the turn of the twentieth century routinely granted
injunctions for infringed patents).
24. For an argument that federal courts lack authority to grant prospective relief
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reasoning of property versus liability rules, assuming that for rights
over inventions whose values are unknown, a property rule is most
25
appropriate.
As in other areas of law, however, the courts first look to four
factors when determining whether the equitable remedy of a
permanent injunction is warranted: (1) whether denial of the
injunction would lead to irreparable injury for the patent holder, (2)
whether money damages are inadequate compensation, (3) whether
a balance of the hardships to the parties favors either outcome, and
26
(4) whether the public interest favors entry of an injunction. The
applicability of the four-factor test to grants of permanent injunctions
27
for patent infringement was upheld by the Supreme Court in eBay.
However, the eBay Court was focused on particular situations in
which property rules typically fail, addressed in the two
28
concurrences. These situations involve what can be described as
either suspect patents or suspect entities and the concern that holdup
is more likely to occur where a patent is overbroad or improvidently
granted or where a patent holder has no economic incentive to limit
29
her demands to the worth of the patented invention. The second of
these concerns, suspect entities, generally has focused on patent
holders who neither produce the patented invention nor license it at
30
what is considered a reasonable cost to others. Concern about these
situations provides the backdrop to the Court’s decision.
Before the Supreme Court decided eBay, permanent injunctions
were routinely granted following a finding of infringement. The
operating assumption was that in rare cases, the public interest in
in such forms, see generally H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in
Lieu of a Final Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661 (2010)
(comprehensively discussing and dismissing legal and equitable remedies at common
law in addition to statutory remedies as bases for a grant of prospective remedies for
patent infringement). For a summary of cases in which such ongoing royalties were
awarded, see id. at 1672–74.
25. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 52–54 (2004) (noting the propertization of intellectual
property law but hailing limits that the property framework imports).
26. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1577, 1578 (2006).
27. Id. at 394, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
28. Id. at 394–95, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at
395–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29. See id. at 395–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that issuance of overbroad patents may affect how courts approach the fourfactor test).
30. Such entities are sometimes called “patent trolls,” or, where judgment is
withheld, “non-practicing entities.” A useful and generally accepted working
definition for an NPE is an entity that neither competes with infringers nor
exclusively licenses to someone who does. Golden, supra note 23, at 2112, 2114.
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access to a particular innovation is strong enough that these access
31
interests trump the right to exclude. In situations that implicated
public health, for example, permanent injunctions were occasionally
32
denied.
Generally, however, a refusal to grant a permanent
33
Courts
injunction did not diminish the right to exclude.
understood that strong remedies resulted in strong incentives to
innovate, and thus the public interest prong of the four-factor test
34
was typically considered to favor granting injunctions.
II. CONCERNS ABOUT SKEWED INCENTIVES, THE EBAY DECISION, AND
ITS PROGENY: A RULE EMERGES
A. The Path to eBay
The furor over NPEs and their skewed incentives grew in the years
leading up to the eBay decision. Analysis of these concerns has not
abated following the decision, although it has come to include
35
36
criticism of the scope of the problem, the existence of a problem,
37
and the ability of courts to effectively implement a solution. NPEs
entered public consciousness in earnest during the litigation
31. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577
(2006).
32. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593, 21
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 69, 85 (7th Cir. 1934) (declining to enter a permanent injunction
against the city after a finding of infringement because enjoining use of the sewage
treatment method would pollute the waters of Lake Michigan and endanger the
health of the surrounding communities).
33. MercExchange, L.L.C., 401 F.3d at 1338, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238–39.
34. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1191, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that district courts should focus the public
interest analysis on whether preliminary relief would harm an existing critical public
interest, rather than solely protecting rights secured by valid patents); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Polaroid Graphics Imaging, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1135, 1146, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1579, 1588 (D. Del. 1989) (explaining that without the
exclusionary nature of patents, innovation would come to a halt, ultimately harming
the greater public), aff’d, 887 F.2d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
35. See, e.g., Damien Geradin et al., The Complements Problem Within Standard
Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 145
(2008) (contending that royalty stacking is not common enough or costly enough to
warrant policy changes, as such changes are likely counterproductive); see also
Golden, supra note 23, at 2145–47 (criticizing research and literature on excessive
compensation for patent royalties, finding it is not representative and grossly
exaggerated).
36. Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 541–42 (2008) (arguing that
they do not).
37. Golden, supra note 23, at 2114 n.16 (dismissing arguments that the threat of
permanent injunctions causes patent holders to negotiate excessive royalties and
arguing that the same technique of using the leverage of a monopoly is common in
other industries).
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38

Research In Motion, the
surrounding BlackBerry technology.
makers of BlackBerry wireless e-mail devices, settled an infringement
lawsuit with the patent-holding company NTP for $612.5 million to
39
avoid the entry of a permanent injunction. The popularity of the
devices, and the threat that millions of consumers would no longer
40
be able to use them, grabbed public attention.
The case also demonstrated both of the bogeymen consistently
referenced in criticism of strong property rights for patents: suspect
patents and suspect entities. The patents at issue covered software,
41
the validity of which has been questioned, and were criticized as
42
improperly granted and excessively broad. Moreover, the public
had a strong interest in access to the infringing device, whereas the
patent holder did not use the patented technology, but rather made
money by licensing that technology. The availability of permanent
injunctions thus became a concern in situations that involved either
38. See Megan L. Wiggins, Patent Reform and Damages Apportionment: Addressing the
Concerns of Industry-Scale Users of the U.S. Patent System Without Legislatively Mandating a
“Specific Contribution over the Prior Art,” 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 273, 289 (2010) (noting
that increased public scrutiny of patent trolls was associated with the landmark case
of NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1857 (E.D. Va. 2005)).
39. NTP, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 785–89, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860–61 (denying
RIM’s motion to stay decision); see also Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612
Million Settlement, CNN MONEY (Mar. 3, 2006, 7:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/ (describing the settlement agreement).
40. See Kelley, supra note 39 (reporting that the lawsuit threatened to shut down
e-mail service for three million users).
41. Recently, however, in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001 (2010), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that software was indeed patentable in
accordance with State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227, 95
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (noting that the machine-or-transformation test may not
be helpful for software); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, The Compatibility of Patent Law and
the Internet, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2783, 2792–94 (2010) (arguing that software should
be patentable).
42. Ian Austen & Lisa Guernsey, A Payday for Patents ‘R’ Us; Huge BlackBerry
Settlement Is Grist for Holding Company, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2005,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B00EFD61E31F931A35756C0A96
39C8B63&pagewanted=all.
Indeed, the patents asserted against RIM were
simultaneously challenged at the U.S.P.T.O. in a reexamination procedure, as were
various patents NTP asserted against other mobile telephone companies. The Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the invalidation of at least portions of
NTP’s reexamined patents. Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4603, 2009 WL 5449437
(B.P.A.I. Dec. 22, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-1116, 2009 WL 4694996
(B.P.A.I. Dec. 3, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4587, 2009 WL 4695029
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 27, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4606, 2009 WL 3837021
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 10, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4602, 2009 WL 3837020
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 10, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4601, 2009 WL 3837019
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 10, 2009); Ex parte NTP, Inc., No. 2008-4594, 2009 WL 3793380
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 10, 2009). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, deciding an
appeal for each of these cases, recently reversed in part and vacated in part. In re
NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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suspect patents or suspect entities because both were considered to
present a higher likelihood of being misused—that is, asserted in a
43
way that expands the intended scope of the patent.
Some of this sudden and particular concern can be traced to
emerging technology sectors. Near the end of the twentieth century,
44
new technologies and business models were emerging.
The
burgeoning information technology field presented the possibility for
45
holdup as a result of its complex, multipart semi-conductor chips.
New business models included companies that, rather than practicing
the technology themselves, made a business of buying patents from
start-ups or others and aggressively enforcing their exclusive rights in
46
order to extract high licensing fees.
Complex inventions are
particularly susceptible to holdup by such NPEs that have nothing to
lose by refusing to license—except for the licensing fees—and do not
anticipate a need for reciprocity from other companies in case of
47
their own future infringement.
These conditions encourage
43. Although the concerns leading up to and addressed in eBay try to remedy an
overly broad assertion of patent scope, refusal to practice or license a patent does not
fall into the formal category of “patent misuse,” a traditional defense to a claim of
patent infringement. Under that defense, a patent will not be enforced when a
patentee has sought to extend the patent grant beyond its scope, such as by tying
sales of a secondary product to those of a primary patented product or entering into
a contract to extend patent protection beyond its term. Analysis often runs along
antitrust doctrine, although elements of misuse stem from the public policy of the
patent system alone. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.2a, at 3-3 to 3-5
(Supp. 2009) (discussing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)). However, § 271(d) of the patent statute
explicitly states that refusal to license a patent or use the technology embodied
therein does not constitute misuse, unless the patentee has significant market power.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). Thus, even though patent misuse may have independent
policy bases in antitrust law, current analysis of nonuse of a patent does not allow for
a finding of misuse if there is not also an element of monopolization of the market.
44. New technologies include business methods used in financial markets.
Another expanding technology was software, which because of its short lead time
and the speed of innovation, arguably does not even benefit from the patent system.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1028–30
(1990) (debating the patentability of newly emerging computer programs and
algorithms).
45. See Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samardzija, Compulsory Patent Licensing: Is
It a Viable Solution in the United States?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 509, 510–
11 (2007) (explaining how new technology is particularly susceptible to holdup due
to “patent thicket,” where hundreds of patents are needed for a single product, yet
they all overlap and block one another).
46. Robin M. Davis, Note, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent
Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and
eBay v. MercExchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 437–38 (2008) (focusing
on companies whose sole purpose is to purchase patented technology from bankrupt
companies for a low price and then threaten companies in that specific technology
area with a lawsuit to extract expensive royalties).
47. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
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extraction of licensing fees that include value added by other
components of the final product and thus exceed the value of the
patent. As a result, rather than reveling in their own strong property
rights in patents, large businesses sounded the alarm on “patent
48
One concern was that, particularly in industries where
trolls.”
products are typically covered by multiple patents, a single patent
holder could extract licensing fees that reflect the value of the entire
product and that are thus well beyond the value of a single patent to
49
the end product.
NPEs may also be problematic because the transaction costs they
impose may have no payoff in the currency of patent law. For
example, an alleged infringer may have independently invented and
produced its goods, deriving no benefit of disclosure from the patent
that is asserted against it. Another inefficiency may occur when an
inventor files for numerous continuations or continuations-in-part at
the patent office and is thereby able to capture subject matter of
competitor products. The strategy of pursuing such patents, called
“submarine patents,” results in the competitor manufacturer
assuming the risk of bringing the product to market, while the patent
50
holder reaps the rewards.
In all of these cases, innovation is
L. REV. 1991, 2015 (2007) (explaining that the risk of holdup is high for complex
inventions where there is no reciprocal risk of litigation and that NPEs bring a
significant portion of infringement suits in industries subject to royalty stacking).
48. Then-Assistant General Counsel for Intel, Peter Detkin, is credited with
coining the term “patent troll” in 1999 to refer to “somebody who tries to make a lot
of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of
practicing and in most cases never practiced.” Daniel J. McFeely, Comment, An
Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn
Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289, 294 (2008) (quoting Lisa Lerer, Mind
Games, IP LAW & BUSINESS, May 2006, at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). But
see Golden, supra note 23, at 2114 (noting the shifting definition of a “patent troll”
depending on the purposes of the speaker).
49. A different suggestion for identifying holdup situations requires determining
whether “the patented component contributes only a small portion of the value of
the end product; the infringement is inadvertent; the cost of designing around ex
post . . . exceeds the cost of designing around ex ante; and the probability of
detection is high.” Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust
Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1181 (2009) (citing Vincenzo Denicoló et al., Revisiting
Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent
Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571, 582 (2008)).
50. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 25, at 111–12 (considering ways to prevent
“submarine patenting,” including prosecution laches, which precludes unreasonable
delay in prosecuting the patent); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse
of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 79 (2004) (detailing the manner in which
patent holders take certain industries by surprise by intentionally delaying the
issuance of their patent as the value of the technology increases, thereby capitalizing
on the unsuspecting company’s desperation to preserve its investments when
claiming infringement). Although some of these patents still exist, the problem has
been mitigated with a patent term that no longer runs from the date of issuance, but
rather from the date of filing of the earliest, related patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)
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occurring in spite of, rather than because of, the specific patent at
51
Such situations are troubling because they present
issue.
inefficiencies that are not accounted for in the traditional balance
struck by the patent system, imposing costs that are arguably higher
than Congress intended. The easy availability of a permanent
52
injunction, critics argue, allows exploitation of such inefficiency.
53
Concerns about suspect entities have been voiced by industry,
54
55
government, and academics alike. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro
analyzed patent holdup situations, concluding that the threat of a
permanent injunction led to systematically high royalty rates in
56
licensing agreements, thus hindering innovation. The leverage for
these market distortions, according to Lemley and Shapiro, “comes
from the ability of a patent owner to capture value that has nothing
57
to do with its invention.”
Critics were also concerned with
innovations in technology sectors such as information technology,
biotechnology, or medical research, in which multiple patents were
likely to cover any eventual product, with a corresponding increased
58
likelihood of patent holdup.
(2006) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for a
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the
date on which the application for the patent was filed . . . .”).
51. Of course, a product accused of infringement may well be covered by other
patents, owned by the alleged infringer, in addition to the NPE’s patent.
52. See Davis, supra note 46, at 433–34 (considering how injunctions often place
NPEs in enhanced bargaining positions and allow them to extract large settlements).
53. See, e.g., Brief of American Innovators’ Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 25–30, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1577 (2006) (No. 05-130); Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of
Petitioner at 5–14, eBay, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (No. 05-130); Brief
of International Business Machines Corp. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 16–18, eBay, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (No. 05-130).
54. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33–56
(2007), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
55. E.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 1992–94; Mark A. Lemley & Philip J.
Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786–
88 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One
Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 151–55 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and
Patent Royalties, 1–5 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished paper), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/royalties.pdf.
Much has been written
specifically about holdup problems in the context of standard-setting organizations.
See, e.g., Jonathan L. Rubin, Patents, Antitrust, and Rivalry in Standard-Setting, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 509, 536 (2007) (challenging violations of standard setting as inefficient
and wasteful); Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 729–33 (2005)
(insisting that standard-setting organizations should encourage more disclosure and
take greater strides to prevent patent holdup).
56. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2009.
57. Id. at 2010.
58. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 480 SCI. 698, 698–700 (1998) (arguing that
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Critics became particularly concerned with the idea that NPEs had
skewed incentives to license, enabling them to extract a higher value
59
This inefficiency
from patents than their patents warranted.
negatively affected the ability of actual innovators to bring new
60
products to market. The problematic scenarios under discussion at
the time the Court decided eBay can be characterized as access
problems. The balance struck by the patent grant rests on the
assumption that the public will benefit from the disclosure of the
61
invention and from the invention’s entry into the market.
For
example, NPEs do not bring products to market by definition, thus
preventing consumers from accessing products. In addition, because
NPEs have skewed incentives to hold out for higher licensing fees
62
than their patents are worth, it is less likely that another company
will bring the invention to market. If the product is commercialized
despite the higher licensing fees, those fees will be passed on to
consumers, making the product sell above the price point some are
63
willing or able to pay. Overbroad or improvidently granted patents
likewise add a cost to any product they appear to cover, thus raising
any consequent market cost and resulting, again, in less public
64
access. Patents that cover one component of a complex product
and that are used to extract unduly high rents affect both access by
biomedical research is approaching a privatization model).
59. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 1992–93 (reiterating how NPEs are
empowered by the threat of injunction, as they can demand excessive royalties from
desperate infringers).
60. Id. at 1993 (declaring that the excessive royalties charged by NPEs create a
tax on products using the technology, making an obstacle to further innovation).
61. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 547–50 (2009)
(discussing the importance of the disclosure function to patent law).
62. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 1992–93 (citing the power that NPEs
have during negotiations as the reason they can hold out).
63. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38–41 (2003) (explaining that higher
royalties paid means higher prices for consumers, which results in low product use
and deadweight on the market).
64. In general, overbroad or improvidently granted patents, or “suspect patents,”
are most easily addressed by invalidation or narrowing of patents based on the
statutory criteria for patentability, such as novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), nonobviousness, id. § 103, and written description and enablement, id. § 112. Lemley
and Shapiro addressed the problem of weak patents with suspect validity. Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2038. In these cases, they explain, accused infringers may
settle for more than the value of the patent, given the uncertainty of whether it will
be held invalid. Id. They suggest that allowing a stay for a design-around will also
help in such cases, as accused infringers can wait out litigation, knowing they will
have time to redesign their products if and when the patent is held valid, while
paying only a reasonable royalty. Id. at 2039–40. Like others, however, they
ultimately think that the main effort to control suspect patents should come from
minimizing the grant of weak patents and allowing for increased post-grant
opposition. Id. at 2044.
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the entity trying to manufacture the complex invention and,
subsequently, public access to the finished invention. Lemley and
Shapiro analyzed the problem in terms of economic incentives, but
their ultimate concern was spurring socially desirable investments in
65
innovation. By voicing the basis for their economic analysis, Lemley
and Shapiro emphasize that these concerns are fundamentally about
supporting the optimum level of innovation so that the innovation
may be secured to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
66
Arts.”
Proposed solutions, for the most part, focused on the adequacy of
money damages and irreparable injury factors of the four-factor
equitable test, to the near exclusion of the remaining factors:
balancing the hardships to the parties and weighing the public
interest. Thus, these proposed solutions rest on the assumption that
application of the first two factors can be tailored to the patentee to
produce incentives for an optimal level of innovation. For example,
one of the amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court in eBay voiced
concerns regarding NPEs and holdups for complex inventions and
suggested that a more robust analysis of the adequacy of money
damages would allow courts to deny injunctions to entities that “seek
67
only to license their invention at a reasonable royalty.” A strong
assumption in this entire strain of thought is that there is no risk of
holdup where a patentee or its exclusive assignee or licensee
68
competes significantly in the market.
B. The eBay Decision
The path of the eBay case from the district court to the Supreme
69
Court has been well-documented. Following a jury verdict of willful
65. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 2163, 2164 (2007) (“If we made any error, it was in assuming that
readers would understand that holdup is recognized as a form of market failure that
leads to inefficiency, primarily by discouraging what would otherwise be socially
desirable investments.”).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and
the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 421, 428 (2007)
(suggesting that one possible reading of the grant of certiorari in eBay was that the
Court should determine how the standard for injunctive relief under the Patent Act
would affect innovation.).
67. Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of
Petitioners at 7, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1577 (2006) (No. 05-130).
68. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2036.
69. See James M. Fischer, The “Right” to Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 4–10 (2007) (outlining Justice Thomas’s
majority opinion in eBay and each of the concurrences); infra notes 86–87 (citing to
post-eBay scholarship and cases that demonstrate courts’ emphasis on direct
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infringement against eBay, the district court determined that patent
70
holder MercExchange was not entitled to a permanent injunction.
The court stated that there was a presumption of irreparable injury
that was rebutted by MercExchange’s willingness to license its
technology, lack of commercial activity, and statements to the media
71
about its litigation strategy.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding,
concluding that the facts of the case were not “sufficiently
72
exceptional to justify the denial of a permanent injunction.” As to
irreparable injury and the adequacy of money damages, the court
stated that enforcement of the right to exclude through grant of an
injunction was “not reserved for patentees who intend to practice
73
their patents, as opposed to those who choose to license.” In so
holding, the court also noted that “in rare instances,” courts
exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief “in order to
protect the public interest,” such as declining to enter an injunction
when there was a need to use patented technology to protect public
74
health.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit,
holding that there was no “general rule that courts will issue
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent
75
exceptional circumstances.” The Court further held that the district
court had wrongly applied the equitable test by adopting “expansive

competition and market share in determining the irreparable injury and inadequacy
of money damages prongs of the equitable test).
70. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 715 (E.D. Va. 2003),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
vacated, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006).
71. Id. at 712. The court cited the public interest in granting strong patents, but
concluded that the questionable nature of business method patents and the value in
having business methods practiced both weighed in favor of denying the injunction.
Id. at 713–14.
72. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577
(2006).
73. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
74. Id. at 1338, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley,
Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d
858, 865–66, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[S]tandards of the
public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and
need for injunctive relief . . . .”)). The Federal Circuit also noted that concern over
the nature of the patent—namely, that business method patents are per se suspect—
did not constitute sufficient reason to deny injunctive relief. Id. at 1339, 74
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237–38.
75. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390–96, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1577, 1578 (2006) (quoting MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1238) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad
76
swath of cases.” The district court had incorrectly concluded that a
patent holder’s willingness to license its patents and its “lack of
commercial activity in practicing the patents” established a lack of
77
irreparable injury. These “broad classifications,” the Court warned,
would result in the denial of injunctive relief to entities such as
universities or self-made inventors who preferred to license their
78
materials.
Both concurrences emphasized that weight should be given to
relevant precedent. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia
and Ginsburg, emphasized that the equitable test was not being
performed on a clean slate and that protection of the right to
exclude often implicated the equitable remedy of an injunction,
79
“implicat[ing] the first two factors of the traditional four-factor test.”
While noting that history might indeed be instructive, Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, stated that new situations might call for new analysis,
specifically pointing to the rise of suits by NPEs in addition to
80
business method patents. As a result, Justice Kennedy appeared to
be charging lower courts with giving weight to the identity of the
patentees (i.e., practicing versus non-practicing entities) and the type
of patent at issue (i.e., business method and otherwise suspect patents
versus more “legitimate” patents) in evaluating the appropriateness
81
of a permanent injunction.
The eBay Court clearly expresses a
concern over NPEs and their effect on other entities’ level of
innovation.
Although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence specifically mentioned
suspect patents and suspect entities as being less deserving of
injunctions, the context was not entirely confined to the first two
prongs of the equitable test—irreparable injury and the adequacy of
money damages. Justice Kennedy wrote that in cases in which patents
are owned by suspect entities, “legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the
82
public interest.” Although Justice Kennedy identifies money damages

76. Id. at 393, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
77. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
79. Id. at 395, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
80. Id. at 396, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581 (stating that there were new considerations
for courts, such as “the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic
function of the patent holder”).
82. Id. at 396–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581 (emphasis added).
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as a primary indicator, he also specifically identifies the public
interest as an important factor in deciding whether an injunction is
83
By focusing only on whether an injunction is the
appropriate.
appropriate remedy for an NPE, courts and scholars have missed the
opportunity to evaluate the appropriateness of an injunction under
the public interest prong of the equitable test.
As detailed in the following section, however, this invitation to take
a second look at the public interest prong of the four-factor test has
not been taken up by the lower courts. As a result, the first two
factors have been twisted to include an analysis that could be done
less tortuously via the fourth factor.
C. eBay’s Progeny: The Market Share Rule
In the wake of eBay, the Federal Circuit has affirmed district court
decisions that have granted injunctions for competitors who show a
84
loss of market share as a result of infringement. It has also affirmed
court decisions that have denied permanent injunctions in cases
where an infringer has contested the patentee’s right on the basis
85
that the parties are not competitors.
These factors are almost
entirely analyzed under the irreparable injury and adequacy of
money damages prongs of the equitable test. The general rule
emerging in the courts is that irreparable injury and the inadequacy
of money damages may be proved when the plaintiff is a direct
86
87
market competitor that practices in the area of its invention, and
83. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
84. E.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1943, 1968 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857
(2011).
85. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s denial of a
permanent injunction); see also Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679,
684, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (same).
86. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange,
126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 631, 654 (2007) (collecting and analyzing post-eBay cases and finding
direct competition to be “the most significant predictor of whether a permanent
injunction will be granted”); see also Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
543, 549–55 (2008) (discussing courts’ reliance on direct competition as a means for
determining the appropriateness of an injunction); Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive
Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 196–98 (2008) (examining
post-eBay decisions and finding that courts “place a heavy emphasis” on whether the
parties are in “direct competition”).
87. See Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging
Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106
MICH. L. REV. 305, 310–22 (2007) (collecting post-eBay cases and finding that
injunctions were granted where the patent holder could show commercialization
within the area of invention of the patent).
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the patent holder can show a loss of market share—particularly in
88
The results in these cases, for the most part,
nascent markets.
respond to concerns of the pre-eBay availability of injunctions to
NPEs: injunctions are denied to non-competitors who have no
market share, presumably because they neither produce nor market
89
the patented product. For example, on remand after the Supreme
Court’s decision, the district court in eBay noted MercExchange’s
inability to demonstrate lost market share in finding that there was
90
no irreparable injury and that money damages would be adequate.
The emerging rule goes further, however. Instead of simply using
the lost market share as an indicator of irreparable injury and
inadequacy of money damages, courts correlate the size of the market
share and the resulting entitlement to an injunction. For example,
the district court found irreparable injury and inadequacy of
monetary damages for direct market competitors in Muniauction, Inc.
88. TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 532–34 (D. Del.
2008) (granting injunction where there were only two competitors in the market and
the infringer had taken away “the recognition of being a technology innovator and
the first global supplier of the patented technology, and an unquantifiable amount
of business opportunities flowing therefrom”); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns
Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669–71 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (granting a permanent
injunction where parties were direct competitors and “[p]laintiff [was] losing market
share at a critical time in the market’s development”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 516
F.3d 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Callaway Golf Co. v.
Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 619, 621 (D. Del. 2008) (discussing the role of
competition when considering a permanent injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
576 F.3d 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc.
v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 WL 4531371, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008)
(noting patent holder’s trial testimony that “distribution to its customer base, or its
market share, is one of its most important assets” in finding irreparable injury and
granting permanent injunction), aff’d, 595 F.3d 1340, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1805
(Fed. Cir. 2010); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-32
(TJW), 2007 WL 869576, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21 2007) (granting an injunction
where parties are direct competitors), vacated on other grounds, 521 F.3d 1351, 86
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Petersen, supra note 86, at 198 (“To
measure the level of competition between the parties, courts often considered the
loss of market share by the patent holder.”).
89. See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007)
(denying a permanent injunction because plaintiff could not show loss of market
share); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1739 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (same).
90. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 590 83 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1688, 1713 (E.D. Va. 2007); see also Commonwealth Scientific & Indus.
Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007)
(granting a permanent injunction following a finding of irreparable harm); Paice
LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4–5 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (denying injunction and noting that there is no market share to
be lost in finding no irreparable injury), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293, 85
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007); z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 440, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739 (finding no irreparable injury where patentee would not
“suffer lost profits, the loss of brand name recognition or the loss of market share”
due to infringement).
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91

v. Thomson Corp., stating that “[p]laintiff and defendants are direct
competitors in a two-supplier market. If plaintiff cannot prevent its
only competitor’s continued infringement of its patent, the patent is
92
of little value.” The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s lost sales to
the defendants caused additional harm, such as loss of market share
93
and harm to the plaintiff’s reputation as an innovator. Similarly, in
94
Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp., the court granted a
permanent injunction where the infringing product was the patent
holder’s only competition because “its sale reduces the [patent
95
holder’s] market share.”
In contrast, another court denied an
injunction in a situation with only one additional market participant,
finding that the third actor in the market made it unclear that the
96
infringing sales took market share from the patentee.
Examining market share has allowed courts to issue injunctions for
91. 502 F. Supp. 2d 477 (W.D. Pa. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 532 F.3d
1318, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
92. Id. at 482 (finding some of the patent claims obvious and others not
infringed).
93. Id.; see also TruePosition Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (finding irreparable injury
stemming from denial of “the recognition of being a technology innovator and the
first global supplier of the patented technology, and an unquantifiable amount of
business opportunities flowing therefrom”); Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc.,
474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 612–13 (D. Del. 2007) (granting a permanent injunction where
patent holder exclusively licensed patents to U.S. subsidiaries and infringement was
by a direct competitor); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401,
420–21 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (granting injunction after finding that “MPT invented a
method, actively created a market, and established a strong market position and
customer goodwill” and that “[u]surping this market by inducing or contributing to
infringement will irreparably harm MPT”) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 258 F. App’x 318
(Fed. Cir. 2007). But see Praxair, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (denying a permanent
injunction where plaintiff alleged loss of market share, profits, and goodwill, but did
not point to specific sales or market data showing a loss).
94. 513 F. Supp. 2d 578 (D. Md. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 543 F.3d 1342, 88
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
95. Id. at 586; see also Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d
537, 558–59 (D. Del. 2007) (finding irreparable injury and inadequacy of money
damages and granting injunction where infringer was the “only competitor in the
vegetarian DHA market for adult foods and beverages”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on
other grounds, 579 F.3d 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 WL
3813778, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (granting a permanent injunction where
the market for deep water drill rigs was small and defendant competed for
customers, using the infringing products to win bids).
96. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp.
2d 554, 558–60 (D. Del. 2008) (noting the public interest merits in providing access
to different types of stents); see also IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d
487, 489 (D. Del. 2009) (denying an injunction where it did not appear that the
parties were “the only market participants”). But see Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet
Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 620–21 (D. Del. 2008) (granting an injunction where the
market contained multiple competitors because infringement began during
innovative period and it was impossible to tell what share of that patent holder would
have captured absent infringement), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 576 F.3d 1331, 91
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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unused patents where the patent holder has likely made a business
decision to employ other technology.
Thus, courts have
distinguished between entities that do not practice any patents and
competitors that have chosen not to practice a particular patent. For
97
example, in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the right to an injunction of a competitor not practicing a
98
patent in a case with facts similar to Continental Paper Bag. The
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that allowing Qualcomm to sell infringing chips
would irreparably harm Broadcom’s efforts to market its competing
99
The Broadcom
products that were not covered by the patents.
decision reinforces courts’ hands-off approach where business
decisions are involved in a determination neither to use nor license
patented technology.
A corollary to courts’ interest in the size of market share held by a
patentee is the weight given to patent holders in emerging markets.
Courts are finding irreparable injury where a patent holder loses its
opportunity to gain a foothold in an emerging market due to
100
infringement. For example, in TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., the
court granted a permanent injunction and noted that, in addition to
taking market share from the patent holder, the infringer also took
“the recognition of being a technology innovator and the first global
supplier of the patented technology, and an unquantifiable amount
101
of business opportunities flowing therefrom.”
The point as to new technology and emerging markets, however, is
the market share question from another view. In a newly developing
market where there are no possible substitutes for the patented
technology, the effect an infringing entrant will have on the patent
97. 543 F.3d 683, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
98. Id. at 702–03, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656–57. The court found that
although Broadcom “does not sell or plan to sell” chips embodying the asserted
patents and rather licenses the technology to downstream user Verizon, the district
court’s finding of irreparable injury was proper. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656–
57. In so finding, the court emphasized the relationship between Broadcom and
Qualcomm as indirect competitors, in that they competed for customers “despite
offering different technology in [their] chipsets.” Id. at 702, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1656. The court reemphasized its holding, pursuant to Continental Paper Bag, that
“[t]here is no requirement in this country that a patentee make, use, or sell its
patented invention” to qualify for the grant of a permanent injunction. Id. at 703, 88
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
100. 568 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D. Del. 2008).
101. Id. at 532; see also Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., No. 04-CV-513-BR, 2007 WL
4180682, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 2007) (“Loss of market share in this nascent market
is a key consideration in finding that Plaintiff suffers irreparable harm . . . .” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 551 F.3d 1323, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1612 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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holder’s market share will be more dramatic than in a crowded
market, where substitutions abound. In a market with many actors, a
patent holder’s market share is less likely to be affected by an
infringer’s entry. A company in a volatile, undeveloped market has
more to gain in terms of market share than one in an established
102
market. In these cases, however, the injury is more difficult both to
calculate and to remedy, thus supporting the idea that an injunction
may be more appropriate than money damages in finding the proper
103
balance between liability and property rules.
The Federal Circuit, exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over patent
104
appeals, has also begun to weigh in on implementation of eBay.
The Federal Circuit has not always treated lost market share and lost
105
sales as dispositive to determinations of irreparable injury. Yet the
court affirmed the entry of an injunction where lost market share was
106
shown, even when weighed against an alleged willingness to license.
Indeed, the court has noted that “[p]ast harm to a patentee’s market
share, revenues, and brand recognition is relevant to determining
102. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (D. Del.
2008) (holding that irreparable harm exists because plaintiff lost its opportunity to
enhance its goodwill and brand loyalty during a critical time period for
development), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 576 F.3d 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
103. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972); see
ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 38–41 (2005) (arguing that injunctive relief
should be the general default remedy for patent infringement for the traditional
reasons property rules are seen to trump liability rules).
104. Certainly, the standard of review dictating that the entry or denial of a
permanent injunction be reviewed for an abuse of discretion limits the court’s review
to a certain extent. At a minimum, however, a court that does not engage in
weighing the four factors will find its decision vacated and remanded. See, e.g.,
Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1352, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1235
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding where the district court did not make any
factual findings regarding the four factors).
105. See, e.g., Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1558, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1781, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument “that potential lost sales
alone could demonstrate ‘manifest irreparable harm’ because acceptance of that
position would require a finding of irreparable harm to every patentee, regardless of
the circumstances” (quoting Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 683,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1990))); see also Nutrition 21 v. United
States, 930 F.2d 867, 871, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding
in the context of a preliminary injunction that “neither the difficulty of calculating
losses in market share, nor speculation that such losses might occur, amount to proof
of special circumstances justifying the extraordinary relief of an injunction prior to
trial”).
106. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1329, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1612, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding no error in the district court’s refusal to
distinguish this case from other lost market share cases on the basis of the patent
holder’s prior licensing of the patent—once to settle litigation and once to an entity
that at the time was not a direct competitor).
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The
whether the patentee has suffered an irreparable injury.”
Federal Circuit now heavily emphasizes the importance of an
108
injunction in nascent markets.
In addition, although the court in
eBay offered no categorical rule as to the availability of permanent
injunctions to entities that do not practice their patents, in Voda v.
109
Cordis Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed just such a denial based on
the district court’s finding that a patent holder had not shown
110
irreparable injury when he alleged harm to his exclusive licensee.
Most recently, the Federal Circuit took the opportunity to address
the analysis of irreparable injury in Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon
111
Manufacturing Corp., holding that the district court abused its
discretion in denying an injunction to Bosch and remanding the case
112
with instructions to enter an injunction.
The district court’s
holding was partly based on grounds that Bosch had failed to show
irreparable injury where it was “not a clear case of a two-supplier
market wherein a sale to Pylon necessarily represents the loss of a sale
to Bosch” and where wiper blades were not “at the core of [Bosch’s]
113
business.”
In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that it was legal
error to conclude that “the presence of additional competitors,
114
The
without more, cuts against a finding of irreparable harm.”
Federal Circuit agreed that the existence of a two-player market
might be substantial grounds for granting an injunction, but
disagreed that more market competitors should automatically cut
against an injunction, particularly where the patent holder was
115
enforcing its rights against other market participants as well.
The
court further held that the district court erred by not crediting
Bosch’s “unrebutted evidence of loss of market share and access to
potential customers” and finding that Bosch had indeed been

107. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861–62, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1943, 1965–68 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 (2011);
see also O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 449 F. App’x 923, 932
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2011) (explaining that although a permanent injunction is meant
to halt future irreparable injury, past harm is relevant to determining the irreparable
nature of the injury).
108. Acumed LLC, 551 F.3d at 1327–31, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615–16 (granting
an injunction due in part to the entrance of a new competitor into the market).
109. 536 F.3d 1311, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
110. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.
111. 659 F.3d 1142, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
112. Id. at 1150–51, 1157, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663, 1668.
113. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 2d 383, 408 (D. Del.
2010), rev’d, 659 F.3d 1142, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
114. Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1151, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664.
115. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664.
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116

Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to be
irreparably harmed.
countering the idea that increasing market share correlates with
increasing irreparable injury. Nonetheless, the connection between
lost market share and a showing of irreparable injury remains strong.
Although the focus on market share is new, the idea that
competitors are deserving of injunctions, regardless of whether they
practice a patent, is not. One of the questions on which certiorari
was granted in eBay was the validity of the Court’s holding in
117
Continental Paper Bag, an early-twentieth-century case standing for
the proposition that non-use of a patent is not grounds for denial of
118
an injunction. The clear distinction between Continental Paper Bag
119
and eBay was that Continental Paper Bag applied to a competitor. In
its Continental Paper Bag holding, the Court entertained the
infringer’s contention that no permanent injunction should be
entered for infringement of a “patent the invention covered by which
has long and always and unreasonably been held in nonuse . . . instead
120
of being made beneficial to the art to which it belongs.” The Court,
however, held the nonuse was not unreasonable, based on the
121
competitor status of the patent holder.
In finding the nonuse not unreasonable, the Continental Paper Bag
opinion takes as given that the patent holder is the best actor to
122
determine when use of a patent will be efficient.
Specifically, the
Court addressed the suggestion that injunctive relief should not be
available for an invention “deliberately held in nonuse for a wrongful
123
purpose,” then noted that the implied reason for the nonuse in the
case at hand—making more money with the existing machines than
could be made using the patented invention—was not

116. Id. at 1152, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
117. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029, 1029 (2005) (granting
certiorari in part to determine whether the Court “should reconsider its precedents,
including Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., on when it is appropriate
to grant an injunction against a patent infringer” (citation omitted)).
118. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). The
Continental Paper Bag Court noted that the only historical deviation from that practice
was during the brief period in which a working requirement was enacted for foreign
patentees. Id. The requirement called for forfeiture of a patent when it was not
“worked” (i.e., introduced into public use) within the United States. Id.
119. Compare id. at 427 (finding the nonuse of the patent to be a reasonable
competitor strategy), with eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1579 (2006) (noting that MercExchange had been willing
to cooperate and license its patents).
120. Cont’l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 424.
123. Id. at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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124

unreasonable. This reasoning evidences a respect for a patentee’s
business decision to withhold from the market—and thus, the
public—technology that might have been superior to that currently
on the market, specifically noting that a rights holder might choose
to avoid the expense of building new machinery necessary to
implement new technology.
This view grants deference to
competitors in a market, with an economic assumption that
competitors within a market are best situated to make determinations
about when it is efficient to practice any given technology. In
general, then, courts are now denying injunctions to those entities
that most concerned scholars, practitioners, and the Supreme Court:
patent holders who exist only to license, possibly at levels
approaching holdups. Courts deny injunctions for suspect entities
through market share analysis. Licensors that do not present holdup
risks, such as research and development shops and universities, have
125
still obtained injunctions.
However, both formalistic and
substantive problems exist with this approach.
III. QUESTIONING THE RULE
A. The Limits of Irreparable Injury and Inadequacy of Money Damages to
Identify Inefficient Actors
The market share rule ensures that only actors who practice their
126
patents will be entitled to injunctions.
Moreover, only firms that
practice in the relevant field of technology will be competitors with
market share, by definition. Thus, awarding only ongoing reasonable
127
royalties to those who have no market share appears to alleviate
124. Id. at 429.
125. See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc.,
492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (granting a research institution a
permanent injunction even though the patentee did not sell patented devices).
126. The effects of a “lost profits” rule, as suggested by James Fischer, would be
similar. See Fischer, supra note 69, at 23–28. Granting injunctions only to patent
holders who claim and prove lost profits damages while denying them to patent
holders who merely claim reasonable royalties would result in a rule where only
competitors in a market would have recourse to an injunction. The problems with
such a rule would be similar to those outlined in the following paragraphs, in that
such a rule would be over- and under-inclusive. The only way in which a lost profits
rule would be better is that, unlike the market share rule, it would not allow
increased market share to weigh more heavily than a smaller amount of market
share. Rather, it would operate as an either/or indicator of appropriateness of an
injunction. Regardless, the problems of such a rule and the emergence of a market
share rule do not make it an attractive alternative to using market power in the
public interest analysis that I suggest in Part IV.
127. Some argue that an award of ongoing, reasonable royalties is essentially the
same as a compulsory license. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 23, at 2148 (suggesting
that a denial of a permanent injunction in favor of a reasonable royalty payment is
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128

concerns of holdup and ensures that other, non-suspect entities will
be able to provide the public with access to innovation at a price
reflective of its value.
The analysis of holdup concerns, however, is overly focused on the
identity and business model of the patent holder in a way that does
not always generate an “appropriate” level of reward. The supposed
solution to the perceived inefficiency introduced by suspect entities is
to limit injunctions for situations “in which the patent holder’s
predominant commercial interest in bringing a patent infringement
129
case is to obtain licensing revenues.”
In terms of form, this
emerging competitor-with-market-share rule is over-inclusive. A rule
allowing only practicing entities the remedy of an injunction
reallocates the monopoly gains in interactions among companies that
specialize in research and development on the one hand, and mass
130
production, sales, and marketing on the other. For companies that
focus on research and development rather than commercialization,
licensing fees and the proceeds from selling intellectual property
131
provide profit and fund future activities. Without the threat of an
injunction, however, such companies are likely to come away from
132
Thus, the allocation of any
negotiations with less compensation.
gains attributable to the patent monopoly could be strongly shifted
toward entities willing to take the commercial risks of bringing a
essentially a compulsory license). If true, compliance with our international
obligations under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement
might also be implicated by the emerging rule. See Andrew C. Mace, Note, TRIPS,
eBay, and Denials of Injunctive Relief: Is Article 31 Compliance Everything?, 10 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 232, 245 (2009) (discussing the WTO definition of a compulsory
license). But see Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support
of Petitioners, supra note 67, at 9 (explaining that an ongoing royalty differs from a
compulsory license because it only applies between parties to the lawsuit, whereas a
compulsory license is a license available to anyone who meets its terms).
128. See supra Part II.A (discussing the holdup concerns leading to the eBay
decision).
129. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2036.
130. According to the report recently released by the Federal Trade Commission,
large companies specializing in various technologies have come to pursue “open
innovation” strategies, whereby they combine their internal R&D efforts with outside
sources such as universities, start-ups, and collaborations with other companies. FED.
TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 34–35 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/
03/110307patentreport.pdf.
131. See Golden, supra note 23, at 2157 (discussing how small firms use patents to
gain revenue for the immediate future); Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why
Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1075 (2008) (noting that “the
threat of damages,” amongst other factors, leads alleged infringers to often pay for
licenses, thus creating an incentive for companies to seek a patent).
132. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1835 (1984) (noting that incentives to innovate are affected by whether the
reward can be reasonably expected, ex ante).
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product to market, rather than those assuming the risk of the initial
innovation. This shift is problematic in one sense because the
Constitution allows a grant of exclusive rights to “Inventors,” not to
133
The market
firms taking on the risk of marketing an invention.
share rule devalues the actual invention and reallocates part of the
patent’s worth to those who compete in the market, regardless of
134
whether those entities choose to practice a particular patent. More
importantly, however, it discourages the trend of “open innovation”
135
that many companies are beginning to follow, and does so without
regard to the consequences.
Although purporting to target
businesses whose main litigation purpose is exorbitant licensing fees,
the emerging rule cannot distinguish among businesses that have no
market share, and thus includes other business models, such as
research and development start-ups and universities. These other
business models may be driving innovation now and in the near
136
future, but by implementing a test that cannot distinguish start-ups
and universities from NPEs, their patent rights become worth less
than those of firms with market share. By reducing the available
rewards to innovative firms that do not practice their inventions,
then, the rule disincentivizes some of the business structures that are
currently driving innovation.
Substantively, John Golden criticized Lemley and Shapiro’s
approach for ignoring the motivations and economic considerations
137
of patent holders.
For example, Golden argues that the cost of
litigation should cause the patent holder to settle for less than it
138
would ultimately receive in damages. In addition to costs, litigation
carries with it uncertainty. Far worse than losing a particular
infringement action, a patent holder faces the possibility that her
133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405, 422–23 (1908) (proclaiming that the constitutional policy of patent law is
to promote the progress of science and art by securing rights to inventors for their
respective discoveries).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 97–103 (discussing the market share rule).
135. See supra note 130 (describing the trend of large companies focusing on
R&D).
136. See supra note 130.
137. Golden, supra note 23, at 2136; see also Dennis Crouch, Reviewing Part III of
Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and
Antitrust Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 587, 588 (2010) (book review) (noting that it is unclear
“whether it is worth the added litigation expense and reduced patent incentive in
order to shadow box with the mythical patent created holdup problems”).
138. Golden, supra note 23, at 2128–29. These views both deal with the
motivations of the parties to litigation, and they assume that the public will be best
served by the proper allocation of rights between them. As discussed below, infra
note 173 and accompanying text, antitrust law is implicated when the interests of the
parties do not balance out to meet those of the public, generally, and efficient levels
of innovation are not likely to occur.
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Even an owner of a patent that was
patent will be found invalid.
properly granted must face the possibility that it will be found invalid
by the court. This possibility should also lower any potential
settlement figure. Golden focuses on the considerations a patent
holder faces in choosing enforcement options to show that incentives
for holdup may not be as strong as Lemley and Shapiro suggest, in
140
addition to challenging the scope of any such holdup. The extent
to which the first two prongs of the equitable test can be employed to
weaken the incentives of suspect entities to engage in holdup is thus
open to debate. However, even when these factors can be useful,
market share is not always the best indicator of the existence of
incentives to innovate.
B. The Limits of Market Share as an Indicator of Irreparable Injury and
Inadequacy of Money Damages
Although this Part continues to question the emerging rule, the
good news is that courts appear to be getting the right result in terms
of addressing the specific, limited problem eBay was meant to fix. For
the most part, injunctions are still available to patent holders
prevailing on an infringement claim. Courts, however, are not
issuing injunctions to some NPEs that exist only to license. In this
sense, the prescribed patent scheme is now one in which the public
and other innovators in the art have a right to access that is cabined
only by the rights of a patent holder with a well-established market
share to make business decisions as to which products are efficient
for it to produce or license. However, irreparable injury and
inadequacy of money damages are factors that focus entirely on the
patent holder’s incentives, and thus differ from access concerns,
which explicitly account for the public’s interest in the patent
141
grant.
Obtaining the “correct” result has sometimes demanded
slight legal contortions. For example, one court found that a
patentee that licensed its patent and relied on licensing fees to fund
its research—and thus had no market share—was nonetheless
142
entitled to an injunction.
The court reasoned that the loss of
139. See Golden, supra note 23, at 2134 (providing that if the patent is invalidated
the patent holder loses the revenue that its patent could have generated); Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75, 76 (2005)
(explaining that the risk of patent invalidation is substantial since roughly half of all
litigated patents are found to be invalid).
140. Golden, supra note 23, at 2132–35.
141. See, e.g., ALAN R. THIELE, ET AL., THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
HANDBOOK: AVOIDANCE AND MANAGEMENT 216 (2010) (explaining the various
interests a court could consider in determining whether to grant an injunction).
142. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492
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future research opportunities otherwise would be irreplaceable.
The court’s reasoning in that case demonstrates both the problems
with using market share to identify inefficient actors and with
assuming NPEs are not irreparably injured and unable to be
adequately compensated by monetary damages.
In fact, the
automatic manner in which courts have correlated market share with
irreparable injury raises a question about whether actors with no
market share might not still suffer irreparable injuries or be
inadequately compensated by money damages, and whether all loss
of market share is irreparable with money damages inadequate to
compensate for the harm.
The district courts that have granted permanent injunctions
relying on the patent holder’s market share have done so under the
formalistic recitation that high levels of market share correlate with
irreparable injury to a patent holder absent an injunction and with
144
the inadequacy of money damages.
However, when calculating
damages for past infringement, juries are routinely called on to take
into account the market share of the patent holder, thus assigning a
145
monetary value to its loss.
Accordingly, although loss of market
share and reputational damages that accompany it may be an
indicator of greater injury, and therefore of a need for higher money
F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007). But see Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v.
Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that harm to
Rambus’s “innovation-based business model” was not irreparable because the lost
opportunity to invest in research was in the past and Rambus would not continue to
suffer lost royalties going forward).
143. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
144. See supra Part II.C (identifying cases where the court looked at the market
share to determine the appropriate relief). Historically, inadequacy of money
damages was a jurisdictional issue that had to be pled in order to bring a case in a
court of equity as opposed to a court of law. See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What
History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadquate-Remedy-at-Law
Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1204–05 (2008); F. Scott Kieff & Henry E. Smith,
How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis, in REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: POLICY
CHANGES WE CAN AFFORD 55, 69 (2009) (explaining that, previously, the inadequacy
of the legal remedy was a jurisdictional question). Post-eBay, however, it is clear that
the inadequacy of money damages is to be weighed along with the other factors
indicating the appropriateness of an injunction.
145. The Georgia-Pacific factors for determining a reasonable royalty include a
determination of whether the parties “are competitors in the same territory in the
same line of business” and “[t]he effect of selling the patented specialty in
promoting sales of other products.” Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369
(2d Cir. 1971); see also Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592,
608, 613 (D. Del. 2007) (taking into account direct competitor status of parties both
for purposes of calculating reasonable royalties and of determining that money
damages were inadequate and granting permanent injunction). Both of these
factors relate to competitor status and the effect of a patent in spurring other sales,
which are closely related to and at least equally nebulous as questions of market
share loss.
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damages, it does not always follow that the losses can never be
146
Rather, larger monetary
compensated with money damages.
damages may be warranted for a patent holder with more market
147
share. In addition, a rule dictating the availability of a permanent
injunction does not always result in an infringer’s exclusion from the
market. Its greatest effect may be on ex ante negotiations, and may
only mean that any license granted will be much more expensive for
148
The real question, of course, is how large damages
the infringer.
must be to encourage efficient levels of research ex ante. Any
difficulty calculating money damages is steps removed from the
concerns that led to eBay, specifically, suspect patents and suspect
entities, their distortions on markets, and the resultant effects on
access. For that reason, it is useful to probe further the ways that
these factors and their application serve the purposes of promoting
innovation, generally, and of distinguishing situations where NPEs
exploit market inefficiencies, specifically.
Ultimately, as discussed above, the right to exclude and the
corresponding remedy of a permanent injunction for infringement
149
are intended to promote innovation. Questions about whether the
first two factors can identify and weed out inefficient actors, and
whether market share is in fact a helpful indicator of those first two
factors, bring into focus problems with the emerging rule. As
discussed, the market share rule is overbroad and suggests the denial
150
of relief to actors that may be innovators. It also makes assumptions
as to different business models that could affect emerging models of
innovation. And in some situations, damages may indeed be
calculated to include lost market share or reputational damages. The
analysis until now has assumed that decisions about how to allocate
permanent injunctions must involve some analysis as to which actors
are the best innovators—or those who will respond to the availability
of the equitable remedy by innovating more. As discussed above,
however, there are problems with using market share to distinguish

146. Of course, awarding damages for past infringement is always backwardslooking. Thus, use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to grant higher damages does not
necessarily mean that money damages were adequate, just that there was no other
option. Only forward-looking relief can include an injunction.
147. See generally Fischer, supra note 69, at 27–28 (providing examples when
monetary damages are sufficient compensation for royalties).
148. See Kaplow, supra note 132, at 1835. Alternatively, once damages become
large enough, they may operate as a de facto injunction. This should occur when
potential damages are higher than an infringer’s potential profit from infringing.
149. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text (discussing the rights granted
by a patent).
150. See supra Part III.A.
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between innovative actors that achieve optimal levels of innovation
(and provide optimal levels of access) on the one hand, and actors
with skewed incentives, who present problems of holdup, restricting
151
innovation, and diminishing access on the other.
C. The Limits of Market Share as an Indicator of Innovative Incentives
The opinions analyzing the appropriateness of an injunction use
market share as a proxy for irreparable injury and inadequacy of
monetary damages to deny injunctions to patent holders who are
152
seen as contributing little to innovation.
After examining the
problems with reliance on irreparable injury and inadequate money
damages as indicators of inefficient actors, as well as the problems
with reliance on market share as an indicator of irreparable injury
and inadequate money damages, however, the correlation between
market share and incentives both to innovate and to bring that
innovation to market is unclear. The antitrust literature analyzing
the effects of market structure on incentives to innovate is
153
informative, painting a complex picture in which market share is an
imperfect indicator of innovative potential.
Although some economists discuss market concentration in terms
of market share—the measure used by courts evaluating injunctions
post-eBay—others have analyzed the effects on innovation of
154
increased market power. Market power is generally considered the
151. See supra Parts II, III.A (identifying holdup concerns and responding to those
concerns).
152. See supra Part II.C (discussing the emergence of the market share rule).
153. The applicability of antitrust theories about the relevance of market power to
the appropriate strength of patents is not limited to patent remedies. See, e.g.,
Andrew Blair-Stanek, Increased Market Power as a New Secondary Consideration in Patent
Law, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 707, 709–10 (2009) (suggesting significant increase in market
power as an additional secondary consideration in determining whether a patent is
non-obvious).
154. A number of the antitrust laws require an initial showing of market power
before anti-competitive behavior can be found. William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981) (explaining
that market power must be shown for a finding of monopolization or attempted
monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act and in violation of
section 7 of the Clayton Act, inter alia). Market power is also important in the
context of patent misuse, as, by statute
[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty
of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having
done one or more of the following: . . . (5) conditioned the license of any
rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of
a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep.

RAJEC.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

TAILORING REMEDIES TO SPUR INNOVATION

6/14/2012 6:52 PM

765

“ability of a firm . . . to raise price above the competitive level without
155
losing so many sales so rapidly that the increase is unprofitable.” It
is a measure of a firm’s ability to control price in the relevant
156
market.
Often, market share and market power are strongly
157
correlated, as control and power tend to be; however, this is not
158
always the case. A firm may have larger market share and yet lack
market power, a situation that arises in markets with low barriers to
159
entry and low start-up costs. A shift upwards in price by such a firm
allows smaller companies and newcomers to capture that market
160
share.
Accordingly, the firm does not have strong market power.
Conversely, a firm with little or no market share might yet be said to
161
have a high level of market power.
The NPEs that have formed a
central part of the discussion so far may exhibit considerable market
power in terms of the prices they can command on licenses. This
situation arises in circumstances Lemley and Shapiro noted were
particularly troublesome in terms of holdup, namely, where the cost
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31, 77 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1801, 1802 (2006) (eliminating the
presumption of market power in a patented product in tying cases in the antitrust
context). The connection between high levels of market power and the potential for
a finding of patent misuse highlights that, in the antitrust context, suspicion is
directed toward those who are strong market participants. This suspicion is lacking
in the market share rule, which places increasing trust in companies with increasing
dominance of the market.
155. Landes & Posner, supra note 154, at 937; see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 89 (4th ed. 2011)
(“Market power is a firm’s ability to deviate profitably from marginal cost pricing.”).
156. One measure of market power is the Lerner Index, which in one formulation
is (P – MC)/P, where P is the firm’s price at its profit-maximizing level of output, and
MC is the firm’s marginal cost at the profit-maximizing level of output. In a perfectly
competitive world, the price will equal the marginal cost and the Lerner Index will
be zero. In contrast, if a firm is able to raise the price higher and higher (towards
infinity), the Index value approaches one. HOVENKAMP, supra note 155, at 89; see also
Landes & Posner, supra note 154, at 946 (demonstrating the effect of market share in
relation to market demand elasticity).
157. See Mika Kato, Transitoriness of Market Power and Antitrust Activity, 6 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 393, 394–95 (2010) (noting that “the most important single
criterion for designating monopolization has been a firm’s market share” and that a
dominant firm can use market power to raise its market share); see also HOVENKAMP,
supra note 155, at 90–91 (“Courts rely . . . on the fact that there is a positive
correlation between market share and market power. . . . All other things being
equal, a firm with a large market share has a greater ability to increase price
profitably than a firm with a smaller share.”).
158. See Landes & Posner, supra note 154, at 947 (outlining the “pitfalls in
mechanically using market share data to measure market power”); see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 155, at 91 (qualifying general correlation to explain that
“[m]arket share is an incomplete proxy for market power,” and that market
elasticities must be taken into account to properly correlate the two).
159. Landes & Posner, supra note 154, at 945–49 (explaining that market share
may not be a good indicator of market power when substitutions for consumption or
production are readily available).
160. Id. at 947.
161. Id.
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of designing around a patent is high and where a patented product
162
The costliness of
forms a small part of a complex invention.
implementing an alternative and the threat of injunction allow an
163
NPE to raise licensing fees without losing customers.
Thus,
although market power is often connected to market share, the
structure of the relevant market also affects levels of market power. A
general correlation between market share and market power can be
assumed to discuss the results and implications of research, though
there are also special cases in which market power and market share
164
are not correlated.
Antitrust laws promote competition in the marketplace by
regulating anti-competitive behavior. The laws primarily govern
mergers and acquisitions, and as a result, analysis tends to look at premerger market structures and compare those with potential post165
merger markets.
The field of antitrust law has a general
“presumption that greater competition in the form of reduced
product-market concentration brings improved market performance
and increased consumer benefits in the form of lower prices, higher
166
quality, and higher output.” However, this view does not hold in all
situations. For example, there are conflicting accounts in the
literature on the connection between market power and incentives to
167
innovate. On one side is the “Schumpeterian” view that innovation
168
“is hardly conceivable with perfect . . . competition from the start,”
162. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2037–39.
163. Id. at 2037.
164. Even without the correlation, however, market share is still relevant to
antitrust inquiries. HOVENKAMP, supra note 155, at 91 (explaining that in many
situations of concern in antitrust, the “‘power’ basis of the offense, then, is market
share, not market power as such”).
165. See Andrew R. Dick, Coordinated Interaction: Pre-Merger Constraints and PostMerger Effects, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 65, 65–66 (2003) (describing the current
market analysis conducted when reviewing a merger).
166. Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1, 2 (2007).
167. Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger
Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 27 (1995) (explaining that the connection between
market structure and innovation has been “debated by economists for decades
without resolution”).
168. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 105 (1950).
Schumpeter continues to explain that:
traditional theory is correct in holding that profits above what is necessary in
each individual case to call forth the equilibrium amount of means of
production, entrepreneurial ability included, both indicate and in
themselves imply net social loss and that business strategy that aims at
keeping them alive is inimical to the growth of total output.
Id. And while he agrees that competition would eliminate these profits, he
nevertheless suggests that because in the course of innovation, “these profits acquire
new organic functions . . . [the ability of competition to eliminate such profits]
cannot any longer be unconditionally credited to the account of the perfectly
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implying that high levels of competition—and thus, low levels of
market concentration—are not conducive to innovation. On the
other side is the view that competition spurs innovation, while
169
monopolies or near-monopolies have incentives to suppress it.
Each view merits further consideration.
The Schumpeterian view argues that companies with significant
market share are better suited to introduce innovations than perfect
170
This account stems from the idea that large firms
competitors.
have equipment and experience such that the costs of introducing
171
innovation are much lower.
This view argues that the elimination
of redundant research and development efforts, in addition to other
savings from economies of scale, are a net benefit that allows for
172
more efficient investment in innovation. Market concentration also
“reduces market uncertainty and provides the cash flow required to
173
engage in costly and risky R&D on an efficient scale.”
Finally,
monopoly or near-monopoly status creates space in the market for
long-term planning and protects against disorganization of the
174
market.
In contrast to the Schumpeterian view, the other view is that the
merger of innovative firms—or R&D firms—in a relatively small
market will lead to incentives to suppress innovation, or at least slow
175
the introduction of innovative products to the market. Thus, a firm
might acquire patents that cover a number of innovative products,
but would have no incentive to introduce improvements to a market
176
that it already controlled. Any new product a company considered
competitive model.” Id. Although Schumpeter may have thought competition was
more conducive to small improvements in current technology, he was more
concerned with larger-scale innovations, or “creative destruction,” that changed the
structures of current businesses. Id. Thus, he thought that what really mattered was
“competition from the . . . new technology . . . which strikes not at the margins of the
profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very
lives.” Id. at 84.
169. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 619 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962) (noting various assumptions necessary to make
this conclusion and also concluding that in both monopoly and competitive
situations, the incentive to invest is less than is socially desirable).
170. SCHUMPETER, supra note 168, at 105.
171. See id. at 100–01 (noting several advantages available to monopolists).
172. Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency
Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 594
(1995).
173. Richard C. Levin et. al., R&D Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure:
New Evidence on Some Schumpeterian Hypotheses, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 20, 20 (1985).
174. SCHUMPETER, supra note 168, at 102–03.
175. See Arrow, supra note 169, at 619 (arguing that competitive conditions give
companies more incentive to invest than monopolistic conditions).
176. Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and
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introducing would be in competition with its other products, and
thus the company would stand only to divide market share it already
had among multiple products, while losing the cost of introducing
177
the innovation. This phenomenon is known as “cannibalization” of
178
A competitor, in contrast, “receives all of the returns
the market.
from a new invention,” and thus has every incentive to bring
179
innovations to market.
Another criticism that may be leveled at the Schumpeterian view is
that it adheres to a dated view of how innovation takes place. Even if
Schumpeter is correct that the most efficient means of introducing
innovation is through large firms whose size allows them to research
efficiently, the truth is that many large innovations take place outside
the structure of large businesses and that small start-up companies
and R&D shops assume the initial risk of following an idea, cashing in
only later when, and if, it is successful by selling the technology or the
180
company to one of those larger firms. In addition, large companies
with market power may find that licensing patents they do not use
181
brings in desirable revenue.
The possibility of a large company
participating in holdup and troll-like behavior diminishes the idea
that there are only two types of actors: licensor-trolls and competitor182
innovators.
The Schumpeterian view would support stronger
remedies for those with greater market power because those are the
most innovative actors in the marketplace. Under this account, there
183
is no reason to suspect them of having skewed incentives. Certainly,
these companies do not exist solely to license their inventions and
thus do not fit into the problem eBay was meant to address, as framed
184
by scholars and practitioners.
If a company with strong market
power refuses to license, it is not a holdup for a higher licensing rate
but a real attempt to stop competitors from offering the innovation
Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 404 (2008) (citing Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 157 (3d ed. 1976)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 130 (characterizing the interactions between R&D firms and
large firms).
181. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 57–58 (discussing Texas
Instruments’s decision in the 1980s to begin asserting patents against its competitors
and the resulting licensing fees it acquired, amounting to more than fifty-five percent
of its total net income by 1999).
182. Id. (using Texas Instruments’s decision to exercise dormant patents to
demonstrate how a company could fall outside either category).
183. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (describing Schumpeter’s view of
competition).
184. Supra Part II.
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on the market. The other view points out that companies with strong
market power may have other reasons to suppress the introduction of
185
new technologies, such as avoidance of market cannibalization.
The effects of market power on incentives to innovate are most
often discussed in the context of mergers and, specifically, mergers in
186
innovation markets.
When evaluating mergers, government
agencies consider the different, possibly opposing accounts outlined
above. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has used the concept
of innovation markets to evaluate anticompetitive effects of a
proposed merger and recently reevaluated, inter alia, the effects of
187
mergers on innovation markets. The horizontal merger guidelines
recently issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC give
credence to both accounts of the possible effects of market power on
188
innovation.
First, the guidelines state the conventional idea that
189
“[c]ompetition often spurs firms to innovate.” Acknowledging the
cannibalization concern, the guidelines note that mergers may
diminish incentives “to continue with an existing productdevelopment effort or reduce[] incentive to initiate development of
190
new products” because the products of one firm would diminish the
191
Once merged, no incentive remains to
sales of the other firm.
commit resources to development of products that will not result in
185. Supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text.
186. Innovation markets are described in the FTC and DOJ’s 1995 Intellectual
Property Guidelines as:
the research and development directed to particular new or improved goods
or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development.
The close substitutes are research and development efforts, technologies,
and goods that significantly constrain the exercise of market power with
respect to the relevant research and development, for example by limiting
the ability and incentive of a hypothetical monopolist to retard the pace of
research and development.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 11 (1995) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF IP], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
0558.htm.
187. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf (outlining how agencies analyze
the effects of mergers on competition, including innovative markets); see also Rapp,
supra note 167, at 19–20 (discussing the DOJ and FTC’s “innovation market
approach” to merger analysis and explaining that “[t]he aim of the [then] new policy
is to introduce dynamic efficiency considerations into merger enforcement, to
recognize the importance of innovation as a means of nonprice competition and a
source of welfare gains, and to prevent mergers that would reduce competition in
innovation”).
188. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 187 (outlining the agencies’
methods to predict a merger’s effect on competition).
189. Id. at 23.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 23–24.
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new revenue streams. Consumers may lose in such situations, both
because of the loss of innovation and because of diminished choice
193
and access to innovation. The guidelines, however, also recognize
another possibility that a merger may “enable innovation that would
not otherwise take place, by bringing together complementary
194
capabilities that cannot be otherwise combined.”
For that reason,
the guidelines suggest that the regulatory agencies consider
efficiencies in research and development resulting from a merger
195
that “may spur innovation but not affect short-term pricing.”
The
possibilities described in the agency guidelines—that increased
market power may suppress or augment incentives to innovate—
reflect the ambiguous state of the literature on the topic.
As recognized in the language of the FTC guidelines, it is possible
that both accounts are right. There is no reason, for example, that a
correlation between market power and innovation need be linear.
Another possibility is an inverted U-shaped correlation between
196
market power and innovation.
In the mid-1960s, F.M. Scherer
performed a study measuring the levels at which companies
employed scientists and engineers as a proxy for investment in
197
innovation.
He found a correlation between increased market
power and an increase in this measure of innovation; however, the
correlation reversed itself after a threshold level of concentration was
198
met. Scherer’s finding seems to give credence to both accounts of
incentives to innovate as a function of market power. Thus, Scherer
validates the Schumpeterian account of a company that does not
participate in the market—and therefore has no market power—such
192. Id. at 23.
193. See id. at 24 (“Where a merger substantially reduces competition by bringing
two close substitute products under common ownership, and one of those products
is eliminated, the merger may also lead to a price increase on the remaining product,
but that is not necessarily a condition for anticompetitive effect.”). In the context of
licensing, the DOJ and FTC have also noted that “even if lawfully acquired and
maintained, [market power] would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual
property owner to harm competition through unreasonable conduct in connection
with such property.” ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF IP, supra note 186,
at 4.
194. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 187, at 23–24.
195. Id. at 31.
196. F.M. Scherer, Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engineers, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 524, 530 (1967) (finding that increased firm size corresponds with
increased patent activity until a threshold is met, at which point, firm size has a
downward correlation with patent activity).
197. Id. at 524.
198. See id. at 530 (“[T]echnological vigor appears to increase with concentration
mainly at relatively low levels of concentration. When the four-firm concentration
ratio exceeds 50 or 55 per cent, additional market power is probably not conducive
to more vigorous technological efforts and may be downright stultifying.”).
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as an NPE in a competitive market, predicting such a company is less
199
Similarly, and in line with both Scherer’s
likely to be innovative.
and Schumpeter’s accounts, a company with a small amount of
market power is unlikely to have the equipment and expertise to
200
develop and bring a product to market.
As a result, the first
innovations such a company contemplates will be costlier than they
would be for a large company already engaged in the general area,
and that company may be less innovative than a larger company. On
the other end of the spectrum, Arrow’s account is validated by
Scherer’s findings. Thus, companies with near-monopolies are
unlikely to introduce innovations that will only cannibalize their own
201
profits.
As a result, although these companies may be innovative,
they may choose not to bring some innovations to market. In
between these extremes are the companies that have the resources,
expertise, and market space to innovate, in addition to having the
incentives to continue introducing those innovations to the market to
202
Many questions remain, and more recent
remain competitive.
empirical analysis has not fully answered the question of how
correlated market power and innovation are, and on what factors this
203
correlation might depend. This complex picture may be the reason
Michael Katz and Howard Shelanski suggest that innovation should
be taken into account in merger enforcement, but that each case
must be evaluated “with a presumption that a merger’s effects on
innovation are neutral except in the case of merger to monopoly,
204
where there would be a rebuttable presumption of harm.”
The more nuanced antitrust description of the correlation of
market power and incentives to innovate has been missing from the
dialogue regarding the grant of permanent injunctions following
eBay. As detailed in Part II, the focus leading up to eBay was solely on
205
NPEs and the potential for holdup that they represented. For that
reason, the clearest solutions focused on identifying NPEs and
denying them permanent injunctions. However, as explained,

199. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (referring generally to the
Schumpeterian view).
200. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (noting the cannibalism concerns).
202. See Arrow, supra note 169, at 619 (determining that there is an optimal level
of competition needed to spur innovation).
203. See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 539–40
(2010) (demonstrating conditions in which even a monopolist would have to
innovate).
204. Katz & Shelanski, supra note 166, at 6.
205. Supra Part II.

RAJEC.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

772

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/14/2012 6:52 PM

[Vol. 61:733
206

market share may not be a reliable indicator of irreparable injury.
In addition, reliance on market share as an indicator of irreparable
injury for identifying companies likely to engage in holdup leads to
questions about whether market share is really an indicator of
innovative potential and, if so, whether the correlation is a simple,
linear one. As detailed, market share may be a helpful indicator of
innovative potential, but the relationship is not simple, and it is likely
207
not linear either. Rather, it appears that a complete lack of market
power may, but does not always, result in lower incentives to innovate
208
and more opportunities for holdup and other inefficiencies.
Exceptions are possible for entities that have specialized in
innovation, such as some start-up companies and universities. This
Part’s exploration of literature analyzing effects of large amounts of
market power suggests that inefficient incentive structures lurk there,
too, and calls into question the usefulness of market power as a proxy
for innovative potential. In particular, companies with high levels of
market power have incentives not to introduce innovations to the
209
market.
Thus far, it has been demonstrated that the first two factors of the
equitable test for injunctions may not be ideal for identifying actors
likely to keep innovation from the market. In addition, increased
market share may not always point to an irreparable injury or the
210
inadequacy of money damages. It is possible that if market share is
a helpful indicator of innovative potential, both very high and very
low levels of market share will correlate with incentives to keep
innovation from the market; as a result, injunction-seeking
companies with high levels of market share should be looked at
skeptically, as well. Market power and market share may not always
correlate. In situations where NPEs could be said to have high levels
of market power but not market share, their lack of innovative
potential—and incentives to hold up—would make the grant of an
injunction less likely under the current market share rule or under a

206. See supra Part III.A (discussing the limitations of the market share test in
assessing injury).
207. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (describing the non-linear nature
of the relationship between innovation and market share).
208. See supra Part II.A (finding efficiencies associated with NPEs).
209. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text (referencing how companies
with dominant market power have cannibalism concerns in introducing innovation
into the market).
210. This Article does not suggest that market share should no longer be
considered relevant to those factors; it is.
However, market share is not
determinative, and the balancing test should not be strained by forcing an analysis
here that belongs elsewhere.
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rule that required more scrutiny for high levels of market power. On
the other hand, companies with high levels of market share that have
low levels of market power (because there are low barriers to entry
and start-up costs in the relevant industry) would be more likely to
receive an injunction under the market share rule and under a rule
that required more scrutiny for high levels of market power. To the
extent that market share and market power are not correlated, a rule
that requires more scrutiny for companies that exhibit market power
would not change the analysis of which companies are likely to
engage in holdup or suppression of technology. Because the effect of
such inefficiencies is an improper balancing of incentives to innovate,
and because the result on either end of the market power spectrum is
a lack of access to technology by the public, the next Part addresses
the public interest prong of the equitable test to determine its utility
in identifying situations where market power is determinative of
innovative potential and usefulness of an injunction.
IV. USING MARKET SHARE CRITICALLY: A GREATER ROLE FOR THE
PUBLIC INTEREST PRONG
Public interest plays a unique role in patent law. Patent suits may
determine rights of private parties, but they also routinely set the
211
scope, validity, and enforceability of patents —all of which are
212
Thus, patents that are misused,
secured against the public.
213
although otherwise valid, may be deemed unenforceable. Likewise,
overbroad patent claims may be invalidated and the rulings given res
judicata effect, or may simply be interpreted to have a scope limited
214
to what the patentee can rightfully claim to have invented.
Similarly, the remedy for patent infringement is about more than the
allocation of rights between the parties.
In weighing the
211. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 139, at 76. The U.S.P.T.O. is also routinely a
party when the denial of a patent is challenged. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1398, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (challenging the validity of DNA molecule
patents); Grasty v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 211 F. App’x 952, 953 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (per curiam) (challenging the denial of a petition to revive abandoned
application).
212. While the consequences of judgments vary depending on which party
prevails and whether a final judgment is obtained at the district or appellate court
level, the allocation of rights between private parties will affect the availability of
products to the public and their prices.
213. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492, 52 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 30, 33 (1942) (describing the unenforceability of a patent misused in a tying
scheme, the Court explained that “[i]t is a principle of general application that
courts, and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid where
the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public interest”).
214. See supra note 64 (explaining judicial responses to overbroad patent claims).
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appropriateness of an injunction, however, the public interest factor
is currently a simple check that public health is not endangered by
215
I suggest a modest expansion, such that
entry of an injunction.
courts determine that the public interest in the balance struck by the
patent grant is also represented in the balance of equities of the
216
injunction grant. Ultimately, the problems the Court attempted to
address in eBay are problems best weighed in terms of the public
interest because it is a more straightforward approach to those
concerns than using market share as a proxy for innovative capability.
The concerns underlying eBay were not merely about
compensation for patent holders; rather, they implicated the
underlying purpose of the patent system to fuel innovation and the
217
balance it strikes to accomplish that. Moreover, the use of market
share as the sole measure of the effect of the remedy on the patent
holder, under the first two prongs of the equitable test, is a proxy for
innovative potential that becomes less dependable in situations in
which companies have high levels of market power. Market share still
tells a story about the nature of harm to a patent holder and the
ability of money damages to remedy that harm. Thus, in nascent
markets, an infringer’s usurpation of market share may indeed be
difficult to calculate, and an ongoing injunction may be the fairest
way to grant ongoing relief. For some business structures, however,
the market share does not answer the question of irreparable injury
and adequacy of money damages. The same concerns underlying the
NPE problem—public access to innovation and incentivizing
218
innovation —that are now routinely considered under the first two
prongs of the equitable test may also be considered under the public
interest prong. Market share may tell a story in that analysis too, but
215. See infra note 230 and accompanying text (describing the possible public
health reasons for denying an injunction).
216. Judge Aldrich’s dissent in Continental Paper Bag, at the circuit level, invoked
the public interest by suggesting that nonuse of a patent by a competitor, for the
purpose of deriving a monopoly over another product, is “an attitude which offends
public policy, the conscience of equity, and the very spirit and intention of the law
upon which the legal right [to exclude] is founded.” Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E.
Paper Bag Co., 150 F. 741, 745 (1st Cir. 1906) (Aldrich, J., dissenting), aff’d, 210 U.S.
405 (1908). The Judge further referenced the public interest in suggesting that the
equitable remedy of an injunction was inappropriate, writing that
the act of acquiring a valuable right, into which the public interest enters,
not for use, but to destroy or withdraw from use, alone involves a certain
measure of wrong, because, upon natural and fundamental grounds, it is in a
sense wrong to buy and withhold a thing of public interest and benefit . . . .
Id. at 751. He continued that in such situations “the right to equitable relief in aid of
the abstract right is forfeited.” Id.
217. Supra text accompanying notes 19–21.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51 (outlining the NPE problem).
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it is a story cabined by acknowledging antitrust concerns that come
with large amounts of market share, and it should act as a
counterweight to the assumption about the level of injury and
consequent rewards.
The interests encompassed under the public interest factor of the
equitable test are as follows: (1) granting sufficiently strong rights to
219
incentivize innovation, (2) gaining access to the invention, through
the patent disclosure and its eventual dedication to the public
220
domain, and (3) gaining earlier access to the invention through its
221
The first and
market availability by the patentee or its licensees.
second interests, encompassing disclosure of inventions and
encouragement of innovation, are equally satisfied whether the
patent holder is a practicing or a non-practicing entity. Indeed, these
222
interests are satisfied by the time a patent application is filed. The
public interest associated with situations of non-existent market
power is the interest in access. There is a societal interest in both
public access to patented technology and access of other innovators
223
working in the art to advance it further.
These access-related
interests are not equally served in the case of practicing and nonpracticing entities. When an invention is practiced, it is likely to be
224
available to the public at some price, and thus available to other
innovators who wish to purchase and use it. An entity that does not
practice its invention—and refuses to license it—withholds these
benefits from the public entirely.
One exception to this
categorization is independent invention. When a non-patent holder
has independently come up with the same idea as a patent holder,
the patent disclosure must have been less valuable than in cases
where there is no independent invention, given that the same thing
219. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480, 181 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 673, 678 (1974) (noting that the right of exclusion provides an incentive to
risk enormous costs in time, research, and development).
220. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shokestsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
736, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1712 (2002) (explaining that “patent rights are
given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public”).
221. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429,
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 672 (1984) (acknowledging that the patent system allows
public access to the products after exclusive control has expired).
222. Patent applications are generally published within eighteen months of filing
but certainly upon the grant of a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006). But see generally
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (arguing for
stronger disclosure requirements).
223. See generally Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 672
(noting that the public interest lies in the benefits derived from the labors of
inventors).
224. This excludes inventions that are used within a company for its own
purposes, such as manufacturing.

RAJEC.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

776

6/14/2012 6:52 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:733

225

In addition, where
was invented without access to the disclosure.
an invention is likely to be independently invented, it may be that the
strong, exclusive rights associated with patents are not necessary to
226
spur the innovation in the first place.
In terms of remedies,
although independent invention is not a defense to a claim of patent
infringement, it does allow an infringer to escape the enhanced
227
damages associated with willful infringement.
Historically, courts
have found that the public interest in promoting innovation weighs
228
in favor of the grant of an injunction. Rarely, the access interest has
been invoked to deny injunctions for reasons relating to public
229
After discussing that history, I suggest that the access
health.
interest need not be so sparingly invoked.
A public interest analysis may be useful in identifying cases where
injunctions would serve the goals of access and innovation. The
public interest factor has been used rarely to deny injunctions. When
the public interest has been considered relevant, it has been for
230
public health reasons; otherwise, it generally has been assumed that
the public interest mainly lies in strong enforcement of patent
231
232
rights. City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, a 1934 case, is the most
frequently mentioned case in this context. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant
225. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REV. 475, 479 (2006) (noting that a patent award is excessive when two or
more inventors independently create the same invention).
226. Id.; see Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1677–78 (2011) (“[W]here one party does not seek a
patent and it appears that this failure to seek a patent is not simply a strategic gambit
to deny the other party a patent, such evidence strongly suggests that a patent
incentive was not needed to motivate the invention.”).
227. David S. Olsen, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 194 n.45 (2009).
228. See infra note 245 (discussing the public interest considerations surrounding
injunctions).
229. See infra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing the public health
considerations surrounding injunctions).
230. See City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593, 21 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 69, 75 (7th Cir. 1934) (declining permanent injunction against the city after
finding infringement because enjoining use of the sewage treatment method would
affect public health). But see Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., No. 04-CV-513-BR, 2007
WL 4180682, at *8 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 2007) (finding insufficient evidence of a public
health issue to find that an injunction would be a disservice to the public interest),
aff’d, 551 F.3d 1323, 1331, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1612, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting
that “in another case, the public interest factor may so strongly weigh against
enjoining the infringer that an injunction would be inappropriate”).
231. Julie A. Burger & Justin Brunner, A Court’s Dilemma: When Patents Conflict with
Public Health, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 20 (2007); see Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849
F.2d 1446, 1458, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (upholding the
district court in finding that public interest in enforcing patent rights outweighed
any other public interest considerations).
232. 69 F.2d 577, 21 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 69 (7th Cir. 1934).
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of an injunction against the City, despite upholding its finding that
the City infringed a patent over a method and apparatus for sewage
233
The court explained that the result of an injunction
treatment.
would be that the City “would close the sewage plant, leaving the
entire community without any means for the disposal of raw sewage
other than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby polluting its waters
and endangering the health and lives of that and other adjoining
234
Another notable case in which an injunction was
communities.”
rejected for public interest reasons that specifically related to public
health was Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research
235
Foundation.
There, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit noted that the patent holder did not intend to use or
license the patented process to irradiate oleomargarine such that it is
236
supplemented by vitamin D.
This fortification of oleomargarine,
the evidence showed, prevented and cured rickets, a disease that
237
disproportionately affected the poor. The court made these notes
“as a tribunal concerned that equitable processes not be used contra
to the public interest, a matter in which the court is not ‘at the mercy’
238
of the parties.”
Although the Vitamin Technologists court discussed
the public interest in granting an injunction, its language was that of
239
patent misuse,
a doctrine that may render a patent entirely
unenforceable but that now, by statute, does not apply to refusal to
240
A defense of patent misuse may include
practice a patent.
233. Id. at 593, 21 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 82.
234. Id., 21 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 82.
235. 146 F.2d 941, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 262 (9th Cir. 1944).
236. Id. at 945, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 267.
237. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 267. Although the connection between vitamin D
deficiency and rickets sounds like a problem distinctly from another era, the
importance of the vitamin is in the news again, with a claim that it “promises to be
the most talked-about and written-about supplement of the decade.” Jane E. Brody,
What Do You Lack? Probably Vitamin D, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at D7.
238. Vitamin Technologists, 146 F.2d at 945, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 267. Ultimately,
however, the court determined that the patents were invalid, and thus its analysis of
the public interest was not dispositive to the ultimate outcome of the case. Id., 63
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 267.
239. Id. at 944, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 266 (noting that “it is not the private use but
the public interest which is dominant in the patent system,” and “[t]he patent is a
privilege[,] [b]ut it is a privilege which is conditioned by a public purpose” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
240. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). Patent misuse is a defense to a claim of patent
infringement, allowing for non-enforcement when a patentee has sought to extend
the patent grant beyond its scope. However, section 271(d) of the patent statute
explicitly states that “refus[al] to license or use any rights to the patent” does not
alone constitute misuse such that a patent owner shall be denied relief. Id. Thus,
nonuse of a patent does not allow for a finding of misuse if there also is not an
element of monopolization of the market beyond that allowed by the patent. The
Court’s concern, expressed in eBay, with “the economic function of the patent
holder”—namely, its concern with patent holders who exist merely to extract high
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241

allegations of antitrust violations; however, misuse may be found
without showing an antitrust violation when enforcement of a patent
242
would be “contrary to public policy.” Thus, public health concerns
have led courts to deny permanent injunctions in some cases on the
basis of the public interest; however, this is the extent of use of the
243
public interest factor in the denial of injunctions.
For the most
part, the public interest is considered to favor a strong patent system
244
with the strong remedy of an injunction to support it.
Post-eBay case law has, for the most part, continued to assert that
the public has an overriding interest in granting strong patents and
responding to their infringement with strong remedies to fuel further
245
innovation. However, some courts have recognized that, as Justice
Kennedy suggested, the public interest may not always be served by
246
Thus, some courts have found that the public
an injunction.
licensing fees through the threat of litigation—cannot be addressed with a finding of
patent misuse, despite the fact that in such cases, “the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations . . . and an injunction may not
serve the public interest.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97,
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1581 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Indeed, where
patent misuse is found, the arguably draconian remedy of unenforceability is
imposed on the patent. Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the
Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1616–17 (1990) (“[O]ptimal
punishment is unlikely in the normal case because the level of patent misuse
sanction is not related to the severity of the patent misuse violation.”).
241. HOVENKAMP, supra note 155, at 262 (discussing application of section 2 of the
Clayton Act, which forbids tying of unpatented products to those under patent).
242. Id. (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 52 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 30 (1942)).
243. See supra note 230 (noting the rare occurrence of denial of an injunction due
to public interest concerns).
244. See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes, 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (W.D.
Tenn. 2006) (“[T]he public maintains an interest in protecting the rights of patent
holders, and injunctions serve that interest.”); see also infra note 245 and
accompanying text (discussing the general belief, after eBay, that emphasizes the
public interest benefits of encouraging innovation through enforcement of patent
rights).
245. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1097, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the public interest in
encouraging innovation); FURminator, Inc. v. Kim Laube & Co., No. 4:08CV00367
ERW, 2011 WL 1226944, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2011) (noting the importance of
injunctions in serving the public interest), appeal dismissed, 440 Fed. App’x 924 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); Enpat, Inc. v. Budnic, No. 6:11-cv-86-PCF-KRS, 2011 WL 1196420, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting that “the public interest factor typically weighs in
favor of granting injunctive relief”); Smith & Nephew, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d at 985
(“[T]he public maintains an interest in protecting the rights of patent holders, and
injunctions serve that interest.”); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F.
Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (“The public has an interest in maintaining a
strong patent system.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 516 F.3d 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
246. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1577, 1581 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that when “the
threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an

RAJEC.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

TAILORING REMEDIES TO SPUR INNOVATION

6/14/2012 6:52 PM

779

interest in access weighs more heavily than the private interests of the
litigating parties; nevertheless, those courts still framed their decision
in terms of the market share rule, concluding that in their cases, a
competitor with market share would not suffer irreparable injury
247
In two district court cases
from the denial of the injunction.
involving the same parties and coronary stent technology, the courts
denied injunctions after analysis of market share and consideration
248
of the public interest in a diverse stent market.
These cases are
illustrative of competing concerns that are all being played out in the
first two factors of the equitable test, but that would be clarified if
they were examined through a public interest lens.
249
In Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., the
Delaware district court found no irreparable injury and that money
damages would be adequate where the parties were in a market with
three head-to-head competitors by looking at market share data and
determining that increased market share for the infringing firm did
250
The
not necessarily come at the expense of the patent holder.
court noted that of the three competitors, Advanced Cardiovascular
Systems, which changed hands during the course of litigation and is
now part of Abbott Labs, had a sixty-three percent market share of
the bare metal stent market, compared with infringer Medtronic’s
251
seventeen percent share.
The court also noted that Advanced
Cardiovascular Systems’s market share was predicted to drop to fiftysix percent by 2010, infringer Medtronic’s market share was
predicted to increase to thirty-three percent, and third-party BSC’s
market share was predicted to drop to eleven percent in that time
252
frame.
As a result, the court concluded that the infringer
apparently was gaining market share at the expense of both of the
other competitors, “clouding the relationship between Medtronic’s
253
infringement and ACS’s losses.”
In addition, the court found
injunction may not serve the public interest”).
247. See discussion infra accompanying notes 248–266 (discussing the role of
market share in a court’s decision to issue an injunction).
248. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C95-03577-DLJ,
2008 WL 4647384, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2008) (denying a motion to modify the
injunction because it had been in force for eight years, any loss of market share
could be proven and compensated, and there was strong public interest in access to
multiple types of stents); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular,
Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554, 561 (D. Del. 2008) (noting public interest in access to
different types of stents).
249. 579 F. Supp. 2d 554 (D. Del. 2008).
250. Id. at 559.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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willingness to license was evidence that money damages would be
254
Thus, in contrast to the general rule of many other
adequate.
courts, the court here determined that a competitor with market
share would not suffer irreparable injury and that money damages
would be adequate. In regards to the public interest factor, the court
cited the “strong public interest in maintaining diversity in the
coronary stent market,” which was “previously recognized by this
255
court and the Federal Circuit.”
A month later, a California district court also denied an extension
of injunctive relief to Advanced Cardiovascular Systems in a lawsuit
involving catheters used in percutaneous transluminal coronary
256
angioplasty.
The court was faced with the question of whether to
extend the injunction to reflect the possible extension the patent
term would receive, making up for time spent testing the products for
257
regulatory compliance. In finding no irreparable injury, the court
explained that any loss of market share would not unduly burden
258
In
such a large company and could be proved and compensated.
this case, the parties were two of the larger companies in the market
and in direct competition with each other, although the court also
noted that two other competitor companies had larger market share
259
in the market it found to be relevant.
The court suggested that
although Abbott might lose some market share to Medtronic when
the court denied the injunction, “nothing suggests that this loss could
have any significant effect on the continued ability of Abbott to
effectively compete in the DES market or to continue to invest in
260
relevant research and development.” The court relied on Abbott’s
willingness to license in finding that money damages would be

254. Id. at 560–61.
255. Id. at 561. Compare Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,
865–66, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[S]tandards of the public
interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and need
for injunctive relief . . . .” (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944))
(internal quotation marks omitted)), with Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 209–10 (D. Mass. 2008) (granting injunction and noting
court’s original impression that public interest would be served by allowing
introduction to the pharmaceutical market, but that ultimately, public is better
served by a “robust patent system”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 580 F.3d 1340, 92
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
256. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C95-03577-DLJ,
2008 WL 4647384, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2008). Percutaneous transluminal
coronary angioplasty is a method of delivering stents using catheters.
257. Id. at *9.
258. Id. at *10.
259. See id. (using the market for percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty
performed with drug-eluting stents).
260. Id.
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261

adequate. Turning to the public interest inquiry, the court found it
would be in the public interest to allow the infringing device to enter
262
the market.
In so finding, the court noted that extending the
injunction would leave just one product on the market at that
263
The court then determined that
“advanced technological level.”
the public interest further did not favor extending the injunction to
account for the regulatory testing done for Food and Drug
264
Administration approval because the patent holder had profited
265
from the patent with no delay for testing.
Although both courts appear to have come to a reasonable
conclusion, it is not clear how the market share decision can be
squared with all the other decisions discussed in Part III.C. However,
these cases would make sense if market share were returned to a
lower level of importance under the irreparable injury and
inadequacy of monetary damages factors, while simultaneously
performing a function under a new, stronger public interest inquiry.
Because the companies are not fighting for market share in an
emerging market, and because there is adequate (indeed, ample)
data about the relevant markets, the loss of market share would not
result in a finding of irreparable injury. However, the high levels of
market share commanded by Abbott in the coronary stent market
would lead courts to carefully probe the effects of an injunction on
266
access.
Therefore, nothing prevents a more nuanced analysis under the
public interest prong of the test. Such an analysis would recognize
the public interest in a strong patent system such that innovation is
incentivized. NPEs may be very problematic in a few situations, but

261. Id.
262. Id. at *11 (citing Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 99 Fed. App’x 928,
935 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[S]trong public interest supports a broad choice of drugeluting stents . . . .”); Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-027-SLR,
2003 WL 22843072, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 21, 2003) (noting the “obvious concern of
depriving the public of the best and safest medical devices by limiting
competition”)).
263. Id.
264. Id. at *13. Abbott had not yet received an extension in patent term; its
request was pending at the time of the decision. Id. at *9.
265. Id. at *10.
266. These cases related to technologies that affect public health. Unlike cases
that previously involved denial of injunctions for public health reasons, however,
these situations do not present the same urgency or need to avoid a major, public
health catastrophe. Thus, these cases would not fit the mold for other injunction
denials based on public health.
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they do not constitute the majority of plaintiffs in patent cases.
Thus, including analysis of the innovative contribution of patent
holders as a public interest inquiry would not lead to wholesale denial
of injunctions. In contrast, the market share inquiry is over-inclusive,
so that courts using the current rule have to first identify, then
exclude, entities that have no market share but are productively
engaged in research and development from the market share rule.
Moreover, the interest of the public is the appropriate legal lens for
evaluating the public interest in access to a particular invention, as
well as the interest of other innovators in using an invention.
Specifically, in cases where a patent holder does not practice the
patented invention, the public interest in access is not met when the
patent holder has no market share, such as in the case of an NPE.
For patent holders with intermediate amounts of market share who
do not practice the patented invention, one can presume that
competition in the market is furnishing alternatives, as is the patent
holder, who has presumably made an efficient business decision to
pursue another line of innovation over the patented technology.
On the far end of the market share spectrum, however, the
efficiency of a patent holder’s decision not to practice its patent is
also questionable, and the public may again be deprived of access to
the innovation. In near-monopoly or strong oligopoly situations, a
company may choose not to implement innovation because of
concerns of cannibalizing its own sales. In addition, without
competitors, companies have less reason to invest in new products, as
they already have full command of the market. This leads to fewer
choices on the market for consumers where a company decides to
market just one of a few innovations and worse choices when a
company chooses not to introduce innovations at all to maximize
sales of what would otherwise be an obsolete product. As a result,
access interests are also weightier for companies with high levels of
market power requesting permanent injunctions. Although the
access interest may weigh more heavily for patent holders with strong
market power who do not use their inventions, I am not suggesting
that injunctions routinely be denied for large companies, either.
Businesses should have wide leeway to decide what inventions to

267. According to a 2009 study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, in the eighteen
districts with the most NPE litigation, from 1995–2008, NPEs accounted for anywhere
from 10.6% to 46.2% of patent suits. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK:
PATENT LITIGATION TRENDS AND THE INCREASING IMPACT OF NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 19
(2009), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/
assets/2009-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
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Nonetheless, merely
pursue and how to be most profitable.
participating in the market should not insulate a company if that
company is pursuing strategies that would result in the denial of an
injunction to an NPE.
Unlike analysis under the irreparable injury and inadequacy of
monetary damages prongs of the equitable test, the public interest
analysis would allow courts to account for the potentially skewed
incentives of a patent holder with either very high or very low levels of
market power and craft an appropriate remedy. This public interest
analysis would not have the problems of being over- and underinclusive and would allow courts to directly address the concerns that
led to the eBay case.
CONCLUSION
District courts have mostly, and correctly, denied injunctions to
those entities about whom alarms were sounded leading up to, and in
the wake of, the eBay decision. However, courts’ reliance on market
power as a proxy for determining when a patent holder would suffer
irreparable injury absent an injunction and where money damages
would not be adequate proves problematic.
This reliance is
particularly problematic when viewed through the lens of the
underlying purpose of the patent grant, which is incentivizing
innovation. Some extremely innovative business structures do not
possess strong market share. Even to the extent that some entities
with little market share are less likely to innovate and more likely to
inefficiently hold up innovation, the hold up concern also applies to
firms with large amounts of market share. Although antitrust
literature varies as to the details, it appears that at either extreme end
of the spectrum, actors have lower incentives to innovate. By
focusing only on market share in the context of irreparable injury
and inadequacy of money damages, courts are narrowly and
mistakenly deciding which actors are efficient and thus deserving of
injunctions. This Article argues that the underlying concern in eBay
is best characterized as one of access to innovation, thus highlighting
the public interest factor of the equitable test. Courts generally
presume that the public interest weighs in favor of injunctions absent
a public health interest in access. However, by weighing the public
268. See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 428 (1908)
(holding that patent was not “‘deliberately held in nonuse for a wrongful purpose’”
where the purpose was “to make more money with the existing . . . machines than
could be made with new . . . machines, when the cost of building the latter was taken
into account”).
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interest in access in all cases—not just those that involve public
health—against its interest in incentivizing innovation, courts would
be able to take a more nuanced view of the link between market
power and innovative potential.

